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COMPETITIVE DEBACLE IN LOCAL TELEPHONY: 
IS THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT  
TO BLAME? 
REZA DIBADJ 
INTRODUCTION 
With much ado, President Bill Clinton signed the Telecommunications 
Act of 19961 into law on February 8, 1996. Setting lofty expectations for the 
new law, the President declared boldly that “[t]oday, with the stroke of a pen, 
our laws will catch up with our future. We will help to create an open 
marketplace where competition and innovation can move as quick as light.”2 
Indeed, the 111-page statute boasted the ambitious goal “[t]o promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher 
 
 
  Assistant Professor, Business Law, University of Miami School of Business Administration. 
J.D., Harvard Law School; M.B.A., Harvard Business School; S.B., Harvard College. I am grateful to 
Professors Peter Shane and Jerry Hausman for their insightful advice. I would especially like to thank 
Professor René Sacasas. 
 1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 502, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in various 
sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-612). 
 2. News Release, Remarks by the President in Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunications 
Act, Conference Report (Feb. 8, 1996), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/telecom/ 
release.html. This optimism seems to have been shared at the state level as well. See, e.g., Alan 
Johnson, What’s the Hangup?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 2001, at 1E (“This job’s done. The 
road to competition is open.”) (quoting David Johnson, a former member of the Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio, on June 12, 1996, when the new Ohio phone regulations were approved). For a 
discussion of federalism issues, see infra Part IV. Note that such optimism was felt internationally as 
well. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Working Party on 
Telecommunications and Information Services Policies, Local Telecommunication Competition: 
Developments and Policy Issues, Doc. No. OCDE/GD(96)179 (1996) 6, available at 
http://www.oecd.urs/pdf/M000014000/M00014297.pdf [hereinafter 1996 OECD Report] (“Over the 
next two years the balance between competitive and monopoly markets will fundamentally change 
with the majority of countries with monopolies moving to liberalise their PSTN markets.”). 
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quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage 
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”3 The Act 
touches many areas of telecommunications,4 but its core is focused on 
breaking the monopoly of the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs)—
more specifically, the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs)5—and 
promoting competition in local6 telephony.7 
As the old saying goes, “that was then, this is now.” Seven years after the 
passage of the Act, it is regretfully safe to posit that the telecommunications 
field is in total disarray. It is one thing to observe that the press has stated as 
much.8 It is quite another to note that even the Federal Communications 
 3. § 502, 110 Stat. at 56 (purpose statement). See also S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 1 (1996) 
(describing the Act as creating a procompetitive national policy framework that sought to eliminate 
barriers to competition in local telecommunications). 
 4. For an overview of the key issues raised by the Act, see Alden F. Abbott, The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Success or Failure? (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/papers/Abbott_Telecom_Act.1996.pdf; Deonne L. 
Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Challenge of Competition, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
1255 (1997). 
 5. The current RBOCs are SBC, Qwest, Verizon, and BellSouth. These RBOCs comprise 93% 
of ILEC access lines and billed access minutes. See Federal Communications Commission, Statistics 
of Common Carriers, Table 2.6 (2001/2002 Edition) (Sept. 15, 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/SOCC/01SOCC.pdf [hereinafter FCC SOCC 
Report]. In addition, as of December 31, 2000, the RBOCs controlled 87% of ILEC loops, as follows: 
Verizon (32.6%), SBC (31.9%), BellSouth (13.3%), Qwest (9.31%). The remaining 13% consists of 
non-RBOC ILECs such as cooperatives that serve rural areas. See Federal Communications 
Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Trends in 
Telephone Service, Table 8.3 (May 2002), available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/ 
Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/trend502.pdf [hereinafter FCC Telephone Trends]. 
 6. For the purposes of this Article, “local” is defined as within a local access and transport area 
(LATA). A LATA, in turn, is “roughly as big as the area covered by one area code.” JEAN-JACQUES 
LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 284 (2000). A more technical 
definition of LATA is a “geographically defined exchange area, created by the AT&T divestiture 
decree, beyond which a local Bell operating company would not carry telephone calls; generally 
centered in a metropolitan area.” INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 324 (1997). See also 47 U.S.C. § 153(25) (2002). 
 7. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout, 
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1576 (1999) (“Congress plainly intended the opening of the local exchange to 
be the centerpiece of the Telecommunications Act.”); Henry Geller, The 1996 Telecom Act: Cutting 
the Competitive Gordian Knot, 29 CONN. L. REV. 205, 205 (1996) (“The impetus for the Act, 
however, was the need to deal with the telephone area, especially local telecommunications.”); Tim 
Sloan, Creating Better Incentives Through Regulation: Section 271 of the Communications Act of 
1934 and the Promotion of Local Exchange Competition, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 309, 311 (1998) (“The 
overriding goal of the 1996 Act is to promote competition in all telecommunications markets. But 
Congress was particularly concerned about introducing and expanding competitive entry into local 
telecommunications service markets.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, What a Difference 18 Months Make, IEEE SPECTRUM, Sept. 1, 2002, 
at 24 (“[T]he industry has been in meltdown . . . capped off, on 21 July [2002], by WorldCom’s filing 
for bankruptcy protection against its creditors.”); Brett Pulley, Commander of the Airwaves, FORBES, 
Apr. 29, 2002, at 78 (“Now the communications industry is under siege. Telecom companies are 
buried in debt and are reporting multibillion-dollar losses. The fiber glut has sent tens of thousands of 
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Commission (FCC) agrees. At a recent conference, FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell did not mince his words when he soberly declared: 
[t]his is an industry suffering—there have been nearly 500,000 jobs 
lost, a reported $2 trillion of market value extinguished, and by some 
estimates companies are laboring under nearly $1 trillion in debt . . . . 
These difficult times in the telecommunications industry have 
understandably raised anxiety high, sometimes even bordering on 
hysteria . . . . Few are prospering. Few are growing. Few are spending. 
Few are investing. The status quo is certain death and can no longer be 
considered a viable option.9 
Ironically, local telephony, the area that the Act was supposed to help the 
most, is faring the worst. The once much-vaunted competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLECs) that were supposed to bring competition to the local market 
have been a failure. As the Association for Local Telecommunications 
Services points out, “[m]ore than 50 CLECs have filed for bankruptcy over 
[2000-2002] and several others have disappeared without notice.”10 The 
market capitalization of publicly traded CLECs dropped 95%—from $86 
 
 
workers to the unemployment offices.”). 
 9. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Remarks at the 
Goldman Sachs Communicopia XI Conference (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2002/ab1002/DOC-226929A1.pdf [hereinafter Powell Communicopia 
Remarks]. See also Yochi J. Dreazen, FCC’S Powell Says Telecom “Crisis” May Allow a Bell to Buy 
WorldCom, WALL ST. J., Jul. 15, 2002, at A1 (Powell noting that the industry is in “utter crisis”); 
Reinhardt Krause, Telecom Shakeout Is Nearing an End: Bankruptcy Wave Ebbs But There’s Still No 
Sense of What the Telecom Field Will Look Like When It’s Over, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 2, 
2002, at A10 (“Telecom firms defaulted on a record $33.1 billion in bonds in 2001.”); Written 
Statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Financial Turmoil 
in the Telecommunications Marketplace: Maintaining the Operations of Essential Communications, 
Address Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the United States Senate 
(July 30, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/educs_public/attachmatch/ DOC-224797A1.pdf 
[hereinafter Powell Senate Statement], (“Clearly, the telecommunications industry is riding on very 
stormy seas.”). For an overview of the bleak outlook in the debt markets, see Robert Konepal, 
Statement Before the Federal Communications Commission En Banc Hearing on Steps Toward 
Recovery in the Telecommunications Industry (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
enbanc/100702/ konefal_statement.pdf. 
 10. Association for Local Telecommunications Services, Annual Report: The State of Local 
Competition 2002, at 5 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.alts.org/Filings/2002AnnualReport.ppt 
[hereinafter ALTS Annual Report]. See also Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural 
Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 
335, 341 (2002) (“Indeed, the competitive sector of the telecommunications industry is in serious 
jeopardy as several CLECs have declared bankruptcy, missed revenue targets, curtailed entry into new 
markets and laid off employees. Moreover, these impacts are not limited to CLECs (and their 
customers); these effects are also being felt upstream with the manufacturers of telecommunications 
equipment themselves.”). Two of the most notable bankruptcies are NorthPoint Communications and 
Winstar Communications. 
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billion to $4 billion—between 1999 and 2001.11 Only one publicly traded 
CLEC, GCI in Alaska, was profitable in 2002.12 One article in the business 
press has even stated that “Darwin’s theory of natural selection is running 
amok [in the telecommunications industry].”13 
How could things go so terribly wrong? Obviously, regulation in general, 
let alone the Telecommunications Act of 1996, cannot explain everything. 
Overall macroeconomic and geopolitical events will necessarily have an 
important impact,14 as will poor business judgment of new market entrants 
who fashion unrealistic business plans.15 However, the importance of 
regulation should not be underestimated; after all, it created the environment 
in which (otherwise rational) business people dreamed up business plans that 
are ridiculed today. Moreover, to the extent that the telecommunications bust 
was a major contributor to the recession, its regulation did in fact drive many 
of the other negative macroeconomic events. As Chairman Powell has 
pointed out, “there have been real policy failings that have played a role in 
the industry’s demise.”16 
Where have those policy failings been? Are they within the Act itself? 
Criticizing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 seems to have become a 
pastime of sorts. One newspaper article sums up the sentiment of many: 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 promised nothing short of a 
telephone revolution. Local phone service from a vast array of phone 
companies; calls delivered over everything from cable TV lines to 
electric wires; and prices driven down by relentless competition. 
 11. See ALTS Annual Report, supra note 10, at 13. 
 12. See id. at 5. 
 13. Reinhardt Krause, Local Phone Firms Struggle to Survive in Funding Drought, INVESTOR’S 
BUS. DAILY, Oct. 4, 2001, at A6. See also Barbara Etzel, A Reckoning for CLECs: Huge Debtloads, 
Recession and Post-Sept. 11 Jitters Put Upstarts’ Survival in Question, INV. DEALERS DIGEST, Nov. 
19, 2001. For a thought-provoking, cynical opinion piece on what really went on behind the scenes 
according to the President of the Progress and Freedom Foundation, see Jeffrey Eisenach, The Real 
Telecom Scandal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A16 (“The [CLECs] lost $82 billion in market 
capitalization between 1999 and 2001. But the investment bankers, and many CLEC insiders, made 
out handsomely. A conservative guess is that the banks took away more than $1 billion in 
commissions and fees, and one study of just seven CLECs showed insiders selling off stock worth 
more than $1.3 billion in 2000 and early 2001.”). 
 14. For an overview of macroeconomic trends affecting telecommunications, see Simon Wilkie, 
Statement Before the Federal Communications Commission FCC En Banc Hearing on Steps Toward 
Recovery in the Telecommunications Industry (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/enbanc/ 
100702/Wallace_statement.pdf. 
 15. See, e.g., Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 390-97. 
 16. Powell Communicopia Remarks, supra note 9. 
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Instead the law, signed by former President Bill Clinton five years ago 
today, delivered gridlock.17 
Even the Supreme Court has chastised the statute, writing that: 
It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a 
model of clarity. It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity 
or indeed even self-contradiction. That is most unfortunate for a piece 
of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy 
worth tens of billions of dollars.18 
Leading academic commentary seems to agree with the Supreme Court. 
Many point to the fact that the Act “maintains a basic confusion of goals and 
policies that has permeated telecommunications policy for thirty years,”19 
that it “substantially fails to deliver on its large promises,”20 or that it “has 
generated more controversy than progress.”21 One has even written that the 
Act’s rhetoric reads like “Eisenhower-era predictions that atomic power 
would soon cost too little to meter and that we would commute via 
jetpacks.”22 At best, certain commentators are lukewarm.23 
As usual, many are also quick to blame the court system. Some point to 
the practical effect of the Act becoming “a vehicle for clever interpretation, 
exploitation and litigation,”24 or a “boon only for lawyers and regulators, 
while consumers have felt few benefits.”25 Former FCC Chairman Reed 
 17. Martha McKay, Local Competition Still Elusive; After the Revolution Firms Bickering 
Dashes Telecom Act Hopes, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Feb. 8, 2001, at B1. In an opinion 
piece in the same newspaper a year later, former FCC Commissioner Susan Ness wrote: “Six years 
later, too many consumers are still waiting.” Susan Ness, Should Verizon Enter New Jersey’s Long 
Distance Market?; No: Entry Will Deter Local Competition, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Jan. 
8, 2002, at I13. 
 18. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). 
 19. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, 
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1279 (1999). 
 20. Lance Liebman, Foreword: The New Estates, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 825 (1997). 
 21. Michael J. Doane et al., Response, Having Your Cake—How to Preserve Universal-Service 
Cross Subsidies While Facilitating Competitive Entry, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 311, 311 (1999). 
 22. REGULATORS’ REVENGE: THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION 1 (Tom 
W. Bell & Solveig Singleton eds., 1998). 
 23. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Commentary, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: 
Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 217 (1996) (“[The] Act, like any such 
legislation, is simply the opening round of a regulatory process.”); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123, 123 (1996) (pointing out that the law is 
“good” where it removes barriers and bad or even “ugly” where it does not; and noting amusingly that 
a statute that defines “telecommunications in a manner such that it includes the act of mailing a letter 
or throwing a newspaper on the lawn, cannot be all that special”). 
 24. Rob Frieden, Regulatory Opportunism in Telecommunications: The Unlevel Competitive 
Playing Field, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 81, 84 (2001). 
 25. Eric M. Swedenburg, Note, Promoting Competition in the Telecommunications Markets: 
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Hundt, a principal architect of the Act, has even stated that if he could rewrite 
the law, he “would have eliminated everything the courts thought was a 
loophole [as] Courts have picked on tiny word choices by Congress and used 
them as excuses for intervening in telecom policy.”26 
This Article challenges the conventional notion that the Act itself is to 
blame for the lack of competition in local telephony, and that somehow 
courts are complicit in this failure. Rather, it argues that regulators took the 
solid underpinnings of the statute and translated them into poor regulations 
even at the most basic level. Ironically, it is the courts that have done their 
best to inject some notion of sanity to regulations that often appear out of 
control. Put simply, the Act has gotten a bad rap. By and large, Congress and 
the courts are not to blame; shockingly poor implementing regulation is. 
Part I of this Article outlines a few fundamentals upon which the 
subsequent analysis is based. It argues that despite technological advances, 
access to the local wireline telephone infrastructure is still critically 
important. Further, there is precious little competition today in wireline 
telephony, and competition can flourish only with appropriate regulation. 
Part II examines the Act’s network disaggregation provisions, with a 
particular focus on two fundamental questions: What portions of the network 
should be unbundled? And at what price? It argues that while the statute 
itself is sound, the regulations promulgated under it evince basic economic 
confusion that has harmed the ILECs, and provoked a series of reactions and 
retaliations. Surprisingly and ironically, the unbundling provisions have 
decimated the CLECs—the very people the regulations were supposed to 
help. A new regulatory framework is proposed. 
Part III shifts to consideration of the Act’s provisions that open up long 
distance to RBOCs and argues that while the overly formalistic statutory 
language may have some flaws, again, the implementing regulations have 
floundered—this time to the advantage of the RBOCs.27 Again, a possible 
solution is explored. Part IV considers the thorny subject of federalism—
here, unlike unbundling and long distance, the complexities appear to be an 
inevitable part of our broader federal system. Nonetheless, Congress was 
again able to devise an innovative new approach—this time to address 
evolving issues of federalism. 
A fundamental theme throughout Parts II, III, and IV is that, contrary to 
 
 
Why the FCC Should Adopt a Less Stringent Approach to Its Review of Section 271 Applications, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1418, 1419-20 (1999). 
 26. See Reinhardt Krause, Telecom Act? More Like Lawyers’ Full-Employment Law, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 5, 2001, at A8. 
 27. For a discussion of a potential exception around RBOC long distance entry, see infra Part III. 
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Chairman Hundt’s belief, the courts have tried their best to backfill for the 
FCC, and that their intuition about where to intervene has been excellent. The 
courts are, however, limited as a generalist judiciary by lack of institutional 
expertise. 
In the end, the Article argues that getting the fundamentals of 
deregulation right will go a long way to curing the telecommunications 
industry’s ills. Chairman Powell has stated that the need for regulatory 
reform is most pressing in local markets where a network access policy “that 
promotes competition, investment and innovation to deploy advanced 
networks”28 is needed. Put simply, this Article argues that rather than tossing 
out the Act, a better approach would be for the FCC to develop regulations 
that coincide with economic and technological reality. 
One methodological point is worth emphasizing before beginning. It is 
important to recognize (often with some amusement), the glaring 
inconsistencies inherent in the position of many telecommunications 
companies. The RBOCs, for their part, engage in vociferous rhetoric on the 
benefits of competition in long distance29 while at the same time quietly 
violating the law and paying fines to preserve their local monopolies.30 New 
entrants to the local market, especially long distance companies,31 sing the 
praises of local competition in telephony while at the same time fighting to 
preserve their own monopolies beyond telephony, notably AT&T in cable.32 
This Article does not dwell here, since it is not concerned with competitor 
welfare. Rather, it takes a dispassionate view, based on law and economics, 
to frame the issue in terms of maximizing consumer welfare. Society’s 
interests should drive the debate. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF LOCAL TELEPHONY 
A. Local Wireline Infrastructure Is Still Important 
A fundamental threshold question arises as to whether the local wireline 
plant is still relevant and worthy of debate in telecommunications law and 
policy. The short answer is yes; despite advances in wireless technologies, 
local telephone loops will remain an essential element of infrastructure for 
the foreseeable future. 
 28. Powell Senate Statement, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part II.D. 
 31. New entrants are also known as interexchange carriers (IXCs). 
 32. See Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond the Monopoly 
Morass, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 2 (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author). 
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There are several reasons underlying this claim. First is the ubiquity of the 
telephone network. As of November 2001, 95% of households in the United 
States had telephones.33 Wireline local service comprises $132 billion, or 
44%, of the telecommunications industry’s entire revenues.34 RBOCs’ total 
plant-in-service is estimated to be well above $300 billion.35 
It is true that with regard to voice communications, wireless technologies 
have had an impact on the importance of the local wireline plant. There are 
already 128 million wireless access lines36 versus 180 million wireline access 
lines,37 with wireless growing rapidly38 and wireline declining slightly.39 
However, it is very unlikely that, even for voice communications, cellular 
phones will replace land lines. A variety of factors, including reliability, 
quality, and coverage, suggest this result.40 If Internet telephony ever 
 33. One hundred million, two hundred thousand out of 107.7 million households. See FCC 
SOCC Report, supra note 5, Table 5.2. For a detailed examination of telephone penetration by state 
over time, see Federal Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division, 
Wireline Competition Bureau, Telephone Penetration by Income by State (Apr. 2002), available at 
http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/pntris01.pdf. For a detailed 
examination of telephone penetration by demographic variables, see Federal Communications 
Commission Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Telephone 
Subscribership in the United States (Feb. 2003), available at http://ftp.fcc/gov/Bureaus/ 
Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/subs0702.pdf. 
 34. Local service is the largest portion. Long distance (toll) comprises $94 billion (31%), 
wireless comprises $76 billion (25%), and payphone companies $1 billion (<1%). See FCC SOCC 
Report, supra note 5, Table 5.13. 
 35. It is estimated to be $333 billion as of end of year 2000. See Robert E. Hall & William H. 
Lehr, Rescuing Competition to Stimulate Telecom Growth 5 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.sandhillecon.con/hlpaper/hlpaper.pdf. 
 36. See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial 
Mobile Services, App. C, Table 1 (FCC No. 02-179, July 3, 2002) (Seventh Report), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-179A2.pdf [hereinafter FCC Wireless 
Report]. Note that the numbers reported are slightly different than those reported in Federal 
Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition 
Bureau, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2002, Table 11 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureau/Comm_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom1202.pdf [hereinafter 
FCC Local Competition Report]. The reason for this small discrepancy is that the FCC Local 
Competition Report only lists subscribers from wireless systems who have more than 10,000 
subscribers. See FCC Wireless Report at 19 n.112. 
 37. See FCC Telephone Trends, supra note 5, Table 8.1. 
 38. At the passage of the Act, there were 38 million wireless access lines. See FCC Wireless 
Report, supra note 36, App. C, Table 1. 
 39. There were 188.6 million wireline access lines in 2000. See FCC Telephone Trends, supra 
note 5, Table 8.1. Note that some of this decline may be due to consumers substituting a single high-
speed digital subscriber line (DSL) line for two phone lines (one for data, one for voice). See also infra 
note 48. 
 40. For example, wireless systems are still prone to low-quality voice transmissions and “dead 
zones” where the connection is dropped. They are also less reliable for critical applications such as 
emergency 911. See Sharon Pian Chan, Wireless Phones Come Home: Ads Push for Everywhere Use, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at C1. 
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becomes significant, it will be delivered into homes and businesses via land 
lines.41 Cable telephony has gotten off to a slow start and will likely remain 
marginal for the foreseeable future.42 
Beyond voice, perhaps an even greater reason why telephone land lines 
will remain ubiquitous is that they can transmit data much more efficiently 
than wireless infrastructure, which has been a significant disappointment so 
far.43 Moreover, given significant development and rollout costs, there are 
strong doubts around the future of third-generation cellular (3G), which 
promises much higher data transmission rates.44 Other technologies, such as 
fixed wireless45 and satellite, are currently impractical; in the words of a 
recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
report, alternative technologies have developed “much slower than 
expected.”46 
Cable, on the other hand, does present a compelling technology option for 
data transmission, at least for households.47 In broadband, cable modems 
 41. As recently as 2001, analysts were singing the revolutionary praises of Internet telephony. 
For example, an OECD Report praised Dialpad.com, which could offer “free web to phone domestic 
voice telephony service to US customers.” Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies, Interconnection and Local 
Competition, Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2000)3/FINAL (2001) 6, available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
pdf/M00003000/M00003019.pdf [hereinafter 2001 OECD Report]. But companies such as 
Dialpad.com are now espousing much more traditional business models—for example, focusing on the 
long distance market and charging by the minute. New U.S. Monthly Plans, at http://www.dialpad.com 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2003). Moreover, Internet telephony has so far proven to be a disappointment, 
given issues with voice quality and latency.  
 42. See Federal Communications Commission, In re Ninth Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, ¶¶ 49-52 (FCC No. 02-338, Dec. 
31, 2002) (MB No. 02-145) (Ninth Annual Report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-338A1.pdf. The latest FCC report indicates that cable-delivered IP 
telephony, which uses data packets over the Internet, is not yet commercially practical, so cable 
operators are using circuit-switched telephony, which routes data packets through traditional telephone 
circuits. See id. ¶ 49 n.150. Moreover, there are only 2.1 million cable telephony subscribers. See id. 
¶ 50. Note that this lackluster performance may be due to cable operators’ desire to protect core video 
revenues above everything else. See Dibadj, supra note 32.  
 43. For example, systems such as “wireless access protocol” (WAP) have proven to be a failure. 
See Junko Yoshida, 3G: In Like a Lion, Out Like a Lamb?, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2002, at 1. 
 44. See id. 
 45. For example, Local Multipoint Distribution Service (LMDS) and Multichannel Multipoint 
Distribution Service (MMDS) only serve niche markets. For an overview of the technology, see 
Federal Communications Commission, In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible 
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, App. B, ¶¶ 31-44 (FCC No. 02-33, Feb. 2, 2002) (CS Docket 98-146) (Third Report), available 
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-33A1.pdf [hereinafter FCC Inquiry]. 
 46. 2001 OECD Report, supra note 41, at 9. 
 47. See Dibadj, supra note 32. 
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compete with Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines (ADSL)48 to allow high-
speed data49 communications to homes. The latest FCC statistics indicate five 
million ADSL lines and nine million cable lines—nearly a two-to-one 
advantage for cable.50 But even here local telephone lines offer the only real 
competition to cable. Moreover, the cable industry is not a symbol of good 
health and innovation: new entrants such as RCN Corporation are in dire 
straits, and incumbents are piling on staggering amounts of debt in an effort 
to finance closed, proprietary networks that protect core video revenues.51 
Beyond the residential market, the importance of wireline access 
increases even more. If other wireline and fiber52 are added to the DSL lines 
above, then noncable wireline infrastructure comprises 42% of high-speed 
lines, cable comprises 57%, and satellite/fixed wireless comprises 1%.53 The 
vast majority of businesses that do not have access to cable infrastructure 
must rely on other wireline infrastructure for their data needs. 
In sum, wireline infrastructure still plays a critical role in moving both 
voice and data, and is very unlikely to be supplanted by cable or wireless 
technologies anytime soon. There is significant local wireline infrastructure 
investment that is not going anywhere.54 Local landlines could paraphrase 
Mark Twain’s famous quip, “reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”55 
B. Local Telephony Markets Are Still Not Competitive 
The next threshold question to consider is whether there is competition in 
the local telephony market. The four large RBOCs—SBC, Verizon, Qwest, 
 48. DSL is a technology that allows traditional low-bandwidth copper loops designed for voice 
communications to carry data at high speeds. ADSL, which is a subset of DSL technology used in the 
residential market, provides speeds in one direction greater than speeds in the other direction (i.e., 
usually subscriber download speeds are significantly higher than upload speeds). For an overview of 
DSL technologies, see FCC Inquiry, supra note 45, App. B, ¶¶ 24-30. 
 49. High-speed lines are lines that allow at least 200 Kbps (thousand bits per second) connection 
in at least one direction. See Federal Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology 
Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 
30, 2002, Table 1 n.1 (Dec. 2002), available at http://fcp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/ 
FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd1202.pdf [hereinafter FCC Access Data]. 
 50. See id. Table 1. 
 51. See Dibadj, supra note 32. 
 52. Wireline technologies other than ADSL include traditional telephone high-speed services (for 
example, expensive T-1 lines) and symmetric DSL. Fiber includes optical fiber to the subscriber’s 
premises. See FCC Access Data, supra note 49, Table 1 n.2. 
 53. In other words, out of the 16.20 million high-speed lines, 5.10 million are ADSL, 9.17 
million are cable, 0.52 million are fiber, 1.19 million are other wireline, 0.22 million are satellite/fixed 
wireless. See id. Table 1. 
 54. For a detailed discussion of sunk costs in the context of access pricing, see infra note 163. 
 55. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980). 
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and BellSouth56—still dominate local markets.57 
There are several indications that seven years after the Act’s passage, the 
amount of competition is still woefully inadequate. From a revenue 
perspective, only 10%, or $13 million out of the $132 million wireline local 
service provider revenue is from ILEC competitors.58 
Furthermore, FCC statistics indicate that about 11% of switched access 
lines are CLEC lines.59 If cable lines are excluded, then the number is closer 
to 10%.60 If the analysis is confined to residences and small businesses, less 
than 8% of access lines are competitive.61 Moreover, there are significant 
differences on a state-by-state basis, with a maximum of 25% competitive 
access lines in New York being an anomaly.62 
The picture is similar for high-speed lines, where CLECs control 
approximately 8% of DSL lines63 and about 17% of all noncable high-speed 
lines.64 Surprisingly, the FCC indicates that ILECs have been adding 
residential high-speed data customers at a faster rate than CLECs.65 
Robert Crandall and Gregory Sidak note that the “vision held by some of 
radically different market structure for local telecommunications has thus far 
failed to materialize.”66 A Business Week article mentions that the “local 
telecom markets remain almost complete monopolies.”67 Note, for instance, 
 56. BellSouth operates primarily in the southeastern United States, Verizon in the northeast, SBC 
in the midwest and southwest, and Qwest in the west and northwest. See Federal Communications 
Commission, Selected FCC Form 477 RBOC Local Telephone Data as of June 30, 2002, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/RBOC_Local_Telephon
e_June_2002.xls. 
 57. When the Act was passed, there were seven RBOCs, plus GTE. Verizon purchased Nynex 
and GTE, Qwest purchased USWest, and SBC purchased Ameritech. For a discussion of the effects of 
these mergers, see Chen, The Magnificent Seven, supra note 7. 
 58. See FCC SOCC Report, supra note 5, Table 5.13. See also FCC Telephone Trends, supra 
note 5, Table 9.7. Note that the RBOCs comprise over 90% of ILEC access lines. See supra note 5. 
 59. This amount is derived from 21.6 million CLEC lines divided by 189.1 million total lines. 
See FCC Local Competition Report, supra note 36, Table 1. See also ALTS Annual Report, supra note 
10, at 8 (CLECs reported to have 9.9% share, or 19.5 million out of 198 million lines). 
 60. Cable comprises 2.6 million of CLEC lines and none of ILEC lines. See FCC Local 
Competition Report, supra note 36, Table 5. 
 61. See id. Table 2. Part II.C, infra, posits that inefficient access pricing has created this 
disparity. 
 62. See FCC Local Competition Report, supra note 36, Table 6. 
 63. See FCC Access Data, supra note 49, Table 5. These non-ILECs have 226,000 of the 5.1 
million ADSL lines and 269,000 of the 1.2 million other wireline lines. 
 64. See id. Thus, in addition to their presence in the ADSL and other wireline categories, non-
ILECs have 682,000 of the 742,000 other lines (e.g., optical fiber). This also indicates that CLECs 
tend to compete more for the advanced-services market. 
 65. See FCC Inquiry, supra note 45, ¶ 51. 
 66. Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 337. 
 67. Steve Rosenbush & Peter Elstrom, 8 Lessons from the Telecom Mess, BUS. WK., Aug. 13, 
2001, at 60. See also Jeffrey Kosseff, A Tough Act to Follow Qwest, THE SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Jan. 
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the contrast between two OECD reports written five years apart. In 1996, 
OECD wrote that “the main reason governments are increasing liberalisation 
of local telecommunications markets is because there is growing recognition 
that the same dynamism evident in other segments of the industry is 
necessary if information infrastructure goals are to be realised.”68 By 2001, 
its perspective had become more cynical, commenting that the “local 
telephone market has thus remained a de facto monopoly in spite of the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications market.”69 
As the Department of Justice has pointed out in the context of antitrust 
policy, competition “tends to drive markets to a more efficient use of scarce 
resources.”70 Competition generally enhances consumer welfare—recall that 
the local telephony monopoly has never been a paragon of innovation.71 For 
instance, as Figure 1 shows, prices have decreased significantly in the long 
distance market, where competition is robust.72 By contrast, monthly charges 
for local telephony have increased. 
 
 
27, 2002, at G01 (lamenting “slick sales pitches rather than improved service . . . confusing bills rather 
than lower prices, and . . . consolidation rather than competition”). 
 68. 1996 OECD Report, supra note 2, at 20. 
 69. 2001 OECD Report, supra note 41, at 9. This pattern seems familiar in other OECD 
countries as well. The recent OECD report noted that CLEC market shares in member countries were 
barely 4% and stated that “competition in the local market has not developed to a significant degree 
and a significant number of consumers in OECD countries do not have any choice but to use the 
incumbent’s local voice telephony services.” Id. at 8. The thirty OECD member countries are 
comprised mostly of the developed economies of North America and Western Europe. See OECD 
member Countries, at http://www.oecd.org/EN/countrylist/O,,EN-countrylist-o-nodirectorate-no-no-
159,0,00.html. 
 70. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers 2 (Department of Justice, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11254.htm. For a more detailed look at the benefits of competition, 
see Dibadj, supra note 32. 
 71. See, e.g., Dhruv Khanna & Bruce M. Aitken, Symposium: Innovation and The Information 
Environment, The Public’s Need for More Affordable Bandwidth: The Case for Immediate Regulatory 
Action, 75 OR. L. REV. 347, 352 (1996) (“Unlike competitive businesses, the monopoly LECs are not 
adept at innovation, deploying new services, expanding output or otherwise successfully seizing new 
business opportunities.”). 
 72. In 2001, long distance carrier toll-service revenue shares were: AT&T, 37.5%; WorldCom, 
23.5%; Sprint, 9.3%; other long distance carriers, 29.7%. See FCC SOCC Report, supra note 5, Table 
1.5. Cf. FCC Telephone Trends, supra note 5, Table 10.1. 
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Figure 1: Average Long Distance Toll Prices Per Minute vs. Local 
Residential Service Monthly Charge73 
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As the New York Times has pointed out, “[t]he slow pace of competition 
for consumers may be one reason local phone rates have continued to keep 
pace with inflation since 1996 while long-distance rates have tumbled 
sharply.”74 Granted, there are structural differences, especially given that 
cross-subsidies distort true cost in local telephone service.75 But the point still 
stands: without competition in long distance, prices would not have declined; 
without competition in local telephony, prices are likely to remain high and 
innovation low. 
C. A Critical Role for Regulation 
Having established that local wireline telephony infrastructure is both 
important and noncompetitive, the final threshold question is whether 
regulation can do anything to help the situation. Several years ago there were 
cries to dismantle the federal regulatory system and rely on some 
combination of tort law, state agencies, and the private sector.76 Leaving 
 
 73. FCC Telephone Trends, supra note 5, Tables 14.1 & 14.4. 
 74. Seth Schiesel, For Most Local Phone Users, Choice Is Not Yet an Option, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
21, 2000, at C1. 
 75. See infra notes 168-72. 
 76. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND 
LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997); Bell & Singleton, supra note 22, at 2 (“[S]erious 
regulatory reform must include long-term plans for closing down the FCC.”); David J. Buerger, 
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aside the sheer impracticality of having different state agencies or a common 
law tort system administer national telecommunications policy, the 
realization has emerged that, especially in industries with large incumbent 
monopolies, the idea of free atomistic competition is a fallacy. Recent 
writings in the business press suggest that not enough regulation, or poor 
deregulation, has led to the current economic crisis.77 In a cynical post-Enron 
world, some even go so far as to propose that proper regulation can help save 
capitalism itself.78 
Noted economists have also argued the importance of regulation to 
telecommunications competition. Professors Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean 
Tirole use the example of New Zealand, where regulatory oversight was 
abolished, then reinstated,79 to demonstrate the “difficulty of ensuring 
competition in the absence of regulation.”80  
Professor Howard Shelanski finds that innovations have been more 
rapidly developed in competitive telecommunications markets, and he writes 
that “regulators and enforcement officials should be wary of claims that, by 
adhering to policies designed to preserve competition, they will impede firms 
from deploying innovations or bringing new services to consumers.”81 
Perhaps most tellingly, Professor Lawrence White, generally not a supporter 
of regulation, told the Washington Post: “I even half choke on the words as I 
say them, but there’s got to be regulatory intervention. Otherwise, the whole 
issue of local competition is truly a joke.”82 
The regulatory gestalt is also changing to recognize this reality. Former 
FCC Chairman William Kennard has noted that “[i]ntroducing competition 
 
 
Enough Is Enough. Why It’s Time to Get Rid of the FCC, NETWORK WORLD, June 5, 1995, at 65. 
 77. Beyond telecommunications, examples include the demise of the Glass-Steagall Act in 
banking leading to conflicts of interest and the lack of derivatives regulation creating suspicious off-
balance sheet financing instruments. See, e.g., Jacob M. Schlesinger, What’s Wrong? The 
Deregulators: Did Washington Help Set Stage for Current Business Turmoil?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 
2002, at A1. Amusingly, Bernie Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom is quoted as saying that the FCC 
rules implementing the Act were “absolutely fabulous.” See id. at A12. 
 78. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, The Nation: Clay Feet; Could Capitalists Actually Bring Down 
Capitalism?, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, at D1. 
 79. In late 2001, the government of New Zealand created the role of Telecommunications 
Commissioner. See New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, Landmark Telecommunications 
Act Passed (Dec. 18, 2001), available at http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecom/ 
minister20011218a.html. This action was partly in response to evidence that the incumbent, Telecom, 
was abusing its market power to the detriment of new entrants such as Clear. See, e.g., Liam Dann & 
Rosemary Howard, Change a Way of Life for “Other Woman”, SUNDAY STAR-TIMES (Auckland), 
Mar. 3, 2002, at 4. 
 80. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 6, at 34. 
 81. Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S. 
Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 85 (2000). 
 
 82. See Peter S. Goodman, FCC Sitting Out Telecom War; Bells Stand to Benefit from New 
Chairman’s Neutrality, Economists Say, WASH. POST, May 3, 2001, at E1 (emphasis added). 
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in monopoly markets requires consistent pro-competition intervention by the 
government . . . . This thought that if the government gets out of the way, 
competition will somehow spontaneously bloom, I just don’t get it.”83 
Perhaps surprisingly, current FCC Chairman Michael Powell, an avowed 
believer in laissez-faire economics,84 recently shared the following telling 
comment: “One of the things I find as a regulator, the pattern is always the 
same. An innovator loves a free market—until they get big. Then they want 
to pull up the ladder. One of our more sacred responsibilities is to never take 
the heat off big companies.”85 
Consistent with this “newfound aggressiveness,”86 the FCC has even 
asked Congress for more power—for example, to enforce local competition 
provisions87 or to protect consumers of now-bankrupt firms.88 For the first 
time since 1970, the FCC has even denied a merger, refusing to transfer 
licenses in the attempted EchoStar/DirecTV merger.89 
While the FCC correctly recognizes the power of regulation, its challenge 
is to use it properly and consistently and not repeat past mistakes.90 For 
example, this Article argues that the FCC’s unbundling regulations ignore 
basic economic principles91 and that it has recently been too lax in approving 
RBOC entry into long distance.92 These actions have dealt a devastating 
blow to proper implementation of the Act. 
 83. Seth Schiesel, Sitting Pretty: How Baby Bells May Conquer Their World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
22, 2001, at C1 (emphasis added). 
 84. Chairman Powell has begun to point out, however, that the press had overplayed his belief in 
the power of hands-off government. See Parloff, supra note 8, at 24. 
 85. See Powell Says Telecommunication Litigation Is to Be Expected, LOC. COMPETITION REP., 
July 1, 2002 [hereinafter Litigation Expected]. This is consistent with a later speech Chairman Powell 
gave in New York where he asked: “[D]o regulators have at their disposal tools of sufficient power to 
drive forward economic growth and productivity by altering the telecommunications regulatory 
landscape? The market will always be the principal driver, but I think the answer is yes.” Powell 
Communicopia Remarks, supra note 9. See also Hall & Lehr, Rescuing Competition, supra note 35, at 
7 (“[A] business will gain by disabling its rivals and making itself a monopolist.”). 
 86. Yochi J. Dreazen & Andy Pasztor, FCC Rejects EchoStar-Hughes Merger, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
11, 2002, at A3. 
 87. See News Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Chairman Powell 
Recommends Increased FCC Enforcement Powers for Local Telephone Competition (May 7, 2001), 
available at http://www.gov/Bureau/Common_Carrier/News-Releases/2001/nrcc0116.html. 
 88. See Powell Senate Statement, supra note 9. Mr. Powell has made providing continuing 
service and restoring confidence the front line of his strategy. See id. at 16-17. 
 89. See News Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Declines to Approve 
EchoStar-DirecTV Merger (Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-229263A1.pdf [hereinafter FCC EchoStar/DirecTV Press Release]. 
 90. For instance, a recent opinion essay offers an argument that the FCC was wrong in denying 
the EchoStar-DirecTV merger. See Malcolm Wallop, Rural Americans? Want Broadband? Don’t Ask 
the FCC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A16. 
 91. See infra Part II. 
 92. See infra Part III. 
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II. DISAGGREGATING THE LOCAL NETWORK 
A. Principles 
1. Economic Underpinnings 
At their core, the local competition provisions of the Act are based on the 
premise that by disaggregating the monopolist’s, or ILEC’s, infrastructure, a 
workable competitive market for local telephony can develop. In other 
words, rather than regulating the retail rates—or “output”—of a monopolist, 
competitors should be allowed access to certain critical inputs that are costly 
to duplicate.93  
The approach of regulating these “bottleneck” inputs rather than retail 
output makes eminent sense because it allows competition to flourish in the 
nonbottleneck portions of the network while protecting consumers from 
monopoly rents in the bottleneck portions. As Professor William Rogerson 
points out: “Regulating narrowly defined inputs instead of outputs is one 
approach regulators can use to attempt to confine regulation to as small a 
sphere as possible, and thereby allow the benefits of competition to infuse 
more segments of an industry.”94 
The next question is whether this disaggregation model is viable in 
telecommunications. After all, there is the view, articulated recently by FCC 
Chairman Powell, that “facilities-based” competition—where a new entrant 
creates its own infrastructure—may be the only tenable form of 
competition.95  
What this point of view ignores, however, are the prohibitive costs and 
inefficiencies engendered in duplicating infrastructure—especially the “last 
mile” of wires into a subscriber’s home.96 A recent OECD report points out 
 93. This is part of a broader trend of regulation moving away from a purely rate-setting function 
and toward one that promotes competition. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998). 
 94. William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle of 
Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation, 2000 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 135 (2000). 
 95. See Powell Communicopia Remarks, supra note 9. 
 96. See, e.g., LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 6, at 22. Note that one can argue that intermodal 
facilities-based competition is preferable—in other words, telephony, cable, wireless, and satellite each 
competing with their own facilities. The problem with this argument is two-fold. First, by limiting the 
debate to intermodal competition, this argument seems to ignore the possibility of intramodal 
competition—in other words, why restrict each mode to a monopolist? Second, there are currently 
only two modes of competition that are economically efficient in most areas: copper wire and coaxial 
cable—at least until advances dramatically improve the cost and functionality of the other 
technologies. As the OECD correctly points out, “considering the huge amount of investment required 
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that this is “the most expensive part of the telecommunications network, and 
it is not possible in the short to medium term for new entrants to have a 
ubiquitous network such as those of the incumbent.”97 As Professor Jim 
Chen has succinctly pointed out, “no one seriously believes that any CLEC in 
the short run can duplicate an incumbent network from scratch.”98 The fate of 
many facilities-based competitors bears out this point.99 
Leading commentators have also emphasized the centrality of the 
interconnection requirement as a competitive paradigm.100 Professor Eli 
Noam has even gone so far as to argue that interconnection becomes a proxy 
for common carriage: “In a competitive regime, interconnection rights will 
achieve most of the goals that lie behind common carriage. Interconnection 
rights, indeed, have become the major battleground in American 
telecommunications.”101 
2. Statutory Language 
Given the appeal of regulating bottleneck inputs through interconnection, 
the Act sought to offer guidance on two fundamental questions: what to 
disaggregate and at what price. Since the statutory language is basic to the 
remainder of this section, it is useful to lay out its key provisions. 
 
 
to build a local loop, it seems that the incumbent’s dominance in the local loop will remain in the near 
future unless there is a technological breakthrough in wireless technology.” 2001 OECD Report, supra 
note 41, at 6. 
 97. See 2001 OECD Report, supra note 41, at 8. The report also points out that as opposed to 
long-haul backbone networks for long distance, last mile infrastructure is “subject to very strict local 
regulation and lengthy discussions with local authorities and private property owners to attain rights-
of-way.” Id. 
 98. Jim Chen, Standing in the Shadows of Giants: The Role of Intergenerational Equity in 
Telecommunications Reform, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 932 (2000). See also Robert E. Hall & 
William H. Lehr, Promoting Broadband Investment and Avoiding Monopoly 8 (Feb. 21, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.sandhillecon.com/hlpaper2/Broadband.pdf (“In 
most locations, it is neither profitable nor economically efficient to build new circuits to homes at this 
time.”). 
 99. The Association of Local Telecommunications Services points out that there were only 
seventy facilities-based CLECs in operation in 2002, down from over 300 in 2000. See ALTS Annual 
Report, supra note 10, at 5. The FCC reports that 29% of CLEC local loops are facilities based, while 
21% are resold and 50% are through unbundled network elements. See FCC Local Competition 
Report, supra note 36, Table 3. But note that most of the facilities-based providers serve businesses in 
large metropolitan areas. Furthermore, CLECs are unprofitable. See supra notes 10-13. 
 100. See, e.g., Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 972 (1997) (“[T]he 1996 
Telecommunications Act creates major interconnection rights and duties . . . . Once the dust settles it 
will be possible for all telecommunications carriers directly or indirectly to interconnect with one 
another as a matter of right.”); Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in 
Local Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617 (1999). 
 101. See Noam, supra note 100, at 956 (emphasis in original). 
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The Act outlined three ways to achieve ILEC network disaggregation 
under § 251. The first method is via interconnection where the ILEC has 
[t]he duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any 
requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local 
exchange carrier’s network— 
(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service 
and exchange access; 
(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier’s network 
. . . .102 
The second, and by far most controversial, method is for an ILEC to 
unbundle its network. This is a “duty to provide, to any requesting 
telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications 
service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis 
at any technically feasible point . . . .”103 Most importantly, in determining 
what network elements should be unbundled, the FCC must at least consider 
whether 
(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is 
necessary; and 
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would 
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to 
provide the services that it seeks to offer.104 
The third, and least controversial way, is “to offer for resale at wholesale 
rates any telecommunications service that the [incumbent] carrier provides at 
retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers.”105 
Perhaps most significantly, Congress offered guidance on how to price 
interconnection and unbundling. According to the Act, “just and reasonable” 
rates 
(A) shall be— 
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-
of return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the 
interconnection or network element (whichever is applicable), and 
 102. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 103. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
 104. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
 105. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A). 
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(ii) nondiscriminatory, and 
(B) may include a reasonable profit.106 
Viewed in light of regulating bottleneck inputs and last-mile facilities, it 
would be difficult to join the bandwagon of critics who delight in critiquing 
the Act.107 Rather, the Act’s statutory language makes sense. It offers three 
logical approaches to the disaggregation model as well as pricing guidance 
that moves away from rate-based regulation. Yet, the Act does not seek to 
micromanage actual implementation. After all, it is not Congress’ job to 
serve as a surrogate for an expert agency. Rather, in the words of one 
commentator, the approach “allows for continuing flexibility; as technology 
changes regulatory overseers can be quick to respond with the appropriate 
new changes.”108 
Unfortunately, the FCC poorly implemented the Act’s guidance, 
especially as it relates to the “necessary” and “impair” standards in the 
unbundling and the pricing provisions. The result has been a protracted 
fiasco. 
B. The Unbundling Saga 
1. Iowa Utilities Board Litigation 
Pursuant to § 251 of the Act, the FCC formulated its First Report and 
Order to implement the local competition provisions.109 A number of 
challenges were brought under these implementing regulations, and these 
were consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.110 Interpretation of the “necessary” and “impair” standards111 was 
one critical element of this litigation.112 
The FCC viewed the “necessary” standard as having been met even if 
“requesting carriers can obtain the requested proprietary element from a 
source other than the incumbent” because “requiring new entrants to 
duplicate unnecessarily even a part of the incumbent’s network could 
 106. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 107. See supra notes 17-26. 
 108. Tim Rupp, Note, The Effect of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on the Local Exchange: 
A Significant Step in the Right Direction, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1140 (1997). 
 109. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) (CC No. 96-98) [hereinafter First Report and Order]. 
 110. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 111. See supra note 104. 
 112. The other central challenge was to the FCC’s jurisdiction. For a detailed discussion, see infra 
Part IV.C.1. 
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generate delay and higher costs for new entrants.”113 Further, a new entrant 
would be deemed “impaired” if “the failure of an incumbent to provide 
access to a network element would decrease the quality, or increase the 
financial or administrative cost of the service a requesting carrier seeks to 
offer, compared with providing that service over other unbundled elements in 
the incumbent’s [local exchange carriers] network.”114 
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed these interpretations as 
reasonable under Chevron deference,115 the Supreme Court disagreed. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia pointed out that the FCC’s 
interpretation of the “necessary” standard is irrational since the FCC cannot 
“blind itself to the availability of elements outside the incumbent’s 
network.”116 The Court also noted that the FCC’s interpretation of the 
“impairment” standard also does not pass muster because it is meaningless to 
posit that “any increase in cost (or decrease in quality) imposed by denial of a 
network element” impairs the “entrant’s ability to furnish its desired 
services.”117 
The Court wrote that the FCC’s interpretation is akin to ignoring the 
“necessary” and “impair” provisions in the statute,118 pointing out that the 
FCC’s own rule interpretation emphasizes the duty to unbundle under 
§ 251(c)(3),119 while treating the limitations on that duty under § 251(d)(2)120 
as merely a permissive “soften[ing] of that obligation by regulatory grace.”121 
The Court wrapped up this portion of the opinion with some harsh words for 
the FCC: 
 113. First Report and Order, supra note 109, at 283. 
 114. Id. at 285. 
 115. 120 F.3d at 809-10. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). The fundamental contribution of Chevron is a two-part test: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . . If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue . . . 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.  
Id. at 842-43 (emphasis added). Chevron has spawned a vast literature. For a recent detailed discussion 
of where the Chevron doctrine may or may not apply, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). 
 116. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389. 
 117. Id. at 389-90. 
 118. Id. at 390. 
 119. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 
 121. 525 U.S. at 391. See also Rebecca Beynon, The FCC’s Implementation of the 1996 Act: 
Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 43-46 (2000) (arguing that the FCC 
erroneously read the § 251(c)(3) requirement into § 251(d)(2), and pointing to other instances where 
the regulatory agency “seems to have shot itself in the foot”). 
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The Commission’s premise was wrong. Section 251(d)(2) does not 
authorize the Commission to create isolated exemptions from some 
underlying duty to make all network elements available. It requires the 
Commission to determine on a rational basis which network elements 
must be made available, taking into account the objectives of the Act 
and giving some substance to the “necessary” and “impair” 
requirements.122 
In effect, the Supreme Court correctly vacated an agency interpretation 
that defies statutory language, legislative intent, and common sense.123 But in 
doing so, two insights emerge. The first insight is that the judiciary saw fit to 
intervene in the rulings of an expert agency, where, one might argue, it 
counts: regarding the fundamental issue of what should be unbundled.124 This 
has spawned an interesting debate as to whether the Court actually applied 
Chevron deference or crafted its own flavor of the nondelegation doctrine.125 
The second insight is that despite its intervention, the Supreme Court does 
not have the institutional competence or authority to fashion a new rule; at 
best it can remand to the agency for reformulation. Thus, even though a 
generalist judiciary might have an excellent intuitive feel as to where the 
regulatory problems are, it cannot supplement the expert agency. The 
ultimate responsibility rests with the FCC. 
2. The FCC Redux 
Unfortunately, after the Iowa Utilities Board litigation, the FCC 
disappointed once again, developing a byzantine set of new regulations. It 
redefined “impairment” to require unbundling if, “taking into consideration 
the availability of alternative element outside the incumbent’s network, 
including self-provisioning by a requesting carrier or acquiring an alternative 
 122. 525 U.S. at 391-92 (emphasis added). 
 123. Indeed, some leading commentators have lamented the “FCC’s blindness to the costs of 
mandatory unbundling.” Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. 
ON REG. 1, 4 (2000). 
 124. Contrast this to the Court’s later position on the second fundamental issue: At what price an 
element should be unbundled. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 125. For a survey of challenges to the Chevron regime, including one that contemplates Iowa 
Utilities Board as an indication of a return to the nondelegation doctrine, see Philip J. Weiser, Federal 
Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1692, 1721-26 (2001). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schechter Poulty at the Millenium: A 
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399 (2000). For a broader 
consideration of whether agency enabling statutes should be viewed as charters, constitutions, or 
sources of common law norms, see Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced 
Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463 (2000). 
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from a third-party supplier, lack of access to that element materially 
diminishes a requesting carrier’s ability to provide the services it seeks to 
offer.”126 
In addition, the regulations now pointed to several factors to determine 
the availability of alternative network elements127 under the new 
“impairment” standard. As if this were not complicated enough, the new 
regulations directed the FCC to also look beyond “impairment” to determine 
whether to unbundle a network element.128 
Following ILEC challenges, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the new rules.129 The court determined 
that the FCC’s uniform, national standard did not take into account the state 
of competition in the actual market.130 The court also rejected each of the 
FCC’s five rationales for the rule.131 The D.C. Circuit summarized by 
chastising the FCC: 
In the end, then, the entire argument about expanding competition and 
investment boils down to the Commission’s expression of its belief 
that in this area more unbundling is better. But . . . we believe it must 
point to something a bit more concrete than its belief in the 
beneficence of the widest unbundling possible.132 
During February 2003, the FCC attempted to begin resolving the issue for 
a third time,133 but its new set of complex rules may well exacerbate the 
situation. The rules first state that unbundling is generally not required when 
serving business customers.134 For residential customers, state commissions 
 126. FCC Common Carrier Services, 47 C.F.R. § 51.317(b)(1) (2001). 
 127. The factors include cost, effect on timeliness of entry, quality, ubiquity, and impact on 
network operations. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.317(b)(2). 
 128. These additional factors are whether unbundling would lead to “rapid introduction of 
competition”; promote “facilities-based competition, investment, and innovation” or “reduced 
regulation”; or be “administratively practical to apply.” See 47 C.F.R. § 51.317(b)(3). 
 129. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 130. Id. at 421-26. 
 131. Id. at 426-28. 
 132. Id. at 425 (emphasis added). In addition, the D.C. Circuit vacated another FCC rule that 
unbundled the high-frequency portion of copper loops based on the premise that there is sufficient 
competition from cable and wireless. Id. at 428-30. This ruling could hinder CLECs in their efforts to 
provide DSL services and is related to the broader debate over whether DSL is an information service 
or a telecom service. See Most Commenters Urge FCC to Apply Unbundling to Bell DSL, LOC. 
COMPETITION REP., July 15, 2002. See also Christopher Stern, U.S. Court Undercuts Rivals to Baby 
Bells; Selling Network Access Cannot Be Required, WASH. POST, May 25, 2002, at E1. 
 133. See News Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adopts New Rules for 
Network Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Phone Carriers (Feb. 20, 2003), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A1.pdf. 
 
 134. More specifically, the rules create a presumption against unbundling high-capacity business 
loops, but this presumption is rebuttable by the states. See Federal Communications Commission, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss1/1
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are left to decide what elements should be unbundled, except that a 
competitor cannot provide DSL service by unbundling only a portion of an 
incumbent’s loop.135 
A few things are extraordinary about this decision, especially in light of 
past failed attempts. The first is how sharply divided the FCC commissioners 
are—one commissioner has summarized it as a “split decision plagued by 
shifting pluralities.”136 In particular, there seems to be significant tension 
between Chairman Powell and Commissioner Kevin Martin.137 Beyond 
reports of clashing personalities,138 the new guidance appears to ignore major 
issues. It seems merely to deflect the difficult questions to state public utility 
commissions rather than offering them greater guidance.139 Moreover, not 
allowing unbundling for DSL will likely deal a severe blow to broadband 
 
 
Attachment to Triennial Review Press Release (Feb. 20, 2003), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A2.pdf. 
 135. See id. In other words, a new entrant would have to pay for the lower frequencies, which 
provide voice transmission, since it is now unable to use merely the high frequency portion to provide 
broadband. In addition, there is no unbundling requirement for an incumbent’s fiber/copper hybrid 
loops or for the small number of fiber loops that run directly to homes. See id. 
 136. News Release, Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Approving in Part, Concurring in Part, 
Dissenting in Part, Re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-231344A5.pdf. 
 137. Chairman Powell had wanted to remove the unbundling obligation in toto, and early press 
reports suggested he would be victorious. See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen & Shawn Young, FCC Plans to 
Erase a Key Rule Aiding Local Phone Competition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A1. However, as the 
decision approached, Commissioner Martin, a Republican, sided with the two Democratic 
Commissioners, Copps and Adelstein, in a 3 to 2 decision over Chairman Powell and Commissioner 
Abernathy. See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, Powell Faces Threat from Within FCC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 
2003, at A4; Reinhardt Krause, Split FCC Snubs Chief, Keeps Bell Oversight Mostly in State Hands, 
INV. BUS. DAILY, Feb. 21, 2003, at A1. 
 138. Direct hints of strife are also provided in Commissioners’ public statements. For example, 
Commissioner Copps wants everyone to “take a deep breath, nourish a collaborative dialogue, lower 
the decibel level and, finally, try to pull together to make some progress.” Health of the 
Telecommunications Sector: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 26, 2003) (statement of Michael J. Copps, 
Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DOC-231559A1.pdf. Commissioner Adelstein observes that “[h]aving this 
proceeding in my first three months was quite a baptism by fire. I feel like I’m ready for just about 
anything now.” News Release, Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Approving in Part, Concurring in 
Part, Dissenting in Part, Re Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers  (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-231344A8.pdf. 
 139. Perhaps the FCC gave power to the states to address the D.C. Circuit’s concern over a 
uniform, national standard. See supra note 130. However, the FCC does not seem to give state officials 
further help as to what to do. See also Health of the Telecommunications Sector: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
(Feb. 26, 2003) (statement of Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Commissioner, Federal Communications 
Commission), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231535A2.pdf. 
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competitors who are not players in voice telephony.140 Finally, by apparently 
taking the current flowed pricing mechanism for granted, the Commission 
has missed an opportunity to deal squarely with the pricing issue.141 
Chairman Powell, in a scathing dissent, has even suggested that the rules will 
not withstand judicial scrutiny and that this will be “strike three” for the 
FCC.142 
To summarize this almost sordid tale: Congress developed unbundling 
provisions based on sound economic principles, but the FCC has repeatedly 
been unable to develop rational implementing regulations. The judiciary has 
the instinct to be able to “sniff out” the problem, but it obviously cannot do 
the FCC’s job for it. We are therefore left at an impasse. 
3. Proposed Approach 
The issue of what to unbundle is hardly as intractable a problem as the 
preceding litigation would make it appear. Indeed, had the FCC relied on 
basic economic principles, it could have avoided a lot of the litigation. 
Under general antitrust principles, even a monopolist can refuse to deal 
with rivals. One important exception, however, is the essential facilities 
doctrine developed at common law.143 The doctrine essentially states that 
under certain circumstances, a refusal to deal is subject to a monopolization 
claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 140. Another perverse consequence of the ruling is that RBOCs will likely slow their investment 
in DSL and fiber to the home. The emerging argument is, given that RBOCs are still subject to general 
unbundling requirements, they lack the profits to invest in new technologies. See, e.g., Julia Angwin & 
Dennis K. Berman, Local-Phone Giants Back Off on Promise to Invest in Broadband Despite Winning 
a DSL Ruling, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 21, 2003, at B1. 
 141. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of pricing. 
 142. See News Release, Chairman Michael K. Powell, Dissenting in Part, Re Review of Section 
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Feb. 20, 2003), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A3.pdf (“The legal errors of today’s 
decision are many to my mind. . . . In choosing to abdicate its responsibility to craft clear and 
sustainable rules unbundling to the State Public Utility Commissions the Majority has brought forth a 
molten morass or regulatory activity that may well wilt any lingering investment interest in the 
sector.”). A few days later, Chairman Powell echoed the same themes before Congress. See Health of 
the Telecommunications Sector: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 26 2003) (statement of Michael K. Powell, 
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-231535A1.pdf (“[T]here seems to be no logical federal policy driving the 
Commission’s decision. . . . I fear the Commission may soon find itself in the embarrassing position of 
having its unbundling regime vacated for a third time.”). 
 143. For a review of the essential facilities doctrine, see Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, 
Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999); Robert Pitofsky, The Essential Facilities Doctrine 
Under United States Law (2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/ 
pitofskyrobert.pdf.  
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In MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.,144 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit developed a four-part test to invoke the 
essential facilities doctrine that requires a showing of “(1) control of the 
essential facility by the monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or 
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the 
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to 
competitors.”145 
Thus, rather than litigating complex, ad hoc implementing rules, the FCC 
could fashion its implementing regulations on this doctrine to force 
unbundling only of essential facilities.146 As Professor John Soma points out: 
Infusing essential facilities principles within section 251 of the 1996 
Act creates investment incentives and ensures a competitive 
marketplace by mandating interconnectivity, resale, and unbundling at 
competitive rates only when a monopolist denies access to a facility 
essential to competition in the local telecommunications market that 
cannot be practically duplicated by a competitor.147 
Some distinguished economists have even developed specific refinements 
to the essential facilities doctrine in the context of local competition. Most 
significantly, Hausman and Sidak have enhanced the four-part essential 
facilities doctrine by adding a fifth requirement “based on critical share, that 
examines whether an attempt by the ILEC to deny the CLEC access to the 
element in question would decrease the competition in the output market for 
telecommunications services.”148 In a somewhat similar vein, Pablo Spiller 
has developed a three-part test, which he has presented in the European 
telecommunications context.149 
 144. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 145. Id. at 1132-33. 
 146. Nothing in the 1996 Act precludes such an application. See Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing 
to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1220 (2002) (“Perhaps Congress did not specifically 
intend to invoke the essential facilities doctrine, but nothing in the statute precludes its application.”). 
 147. John T. Soma et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated 
Telecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 565, 613 (1998). See also Elizabeth A. 
Nowicki, Note, Competition in the Local Telecommunications Market: Legislate or Litigate?, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 353, 364 (1996) (“In the local telecommunications market after deregulation . . . it is 
more appropriate to apply the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ . . . .”); Robinson, supra note 146, at 1217-
23 (discussing essential facilities in the context of local telephone competition). For a discussion of 
how essential facilities may be a better approach than tying in antitrust enforcement in high technology 
networks, see Thomas A Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic 
Networks, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 148. Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory 
Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 505 (1999). For a fuller description 
of the Hausman-Sidak test, see id. at 479-80. 
 149. Spiller’s three questions are as follows: “Do competitors build their own networks? Has 
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Even the Supreme Court has dropped hints, which the FCC has 
mysteriously ignored. In the Iowa Utilities Board opinion, Justice Scalia 
cautioned that: 
We need not decide whether, as a matter of law, the 1996 Act requires 
the FCC to apply that [essential facilities] standard; it may be that 
some other standard would provide an equivalent or better criterion for 
the limitation upon network-element availability that the statute has in 
mind. But we do agree with the incumbents that the Act requires the 
FCC to apply some limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of 
the Act, which it has simply failed to do.150 
Perhaps most tellingly, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer specifically 
refers to the fact that the essential facilities doctrine could apply to 
§ 251(d)(2),151 and goes on to add the following profound insight: 
Increased sharing by itself does not automatically mean increased 
competition. It is in the unshared, not in the shared, portions of the 
enterprise that meaningful competition would likely emerge. Rules 
that force firms to share every resource or element of a business would 
create not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, not 
the marketplace, would set the relevant terms.152 
In fact, Justice Breyer’s suggestion gets to the heart of the Act’s attempt 
to regulate critical inputs narrowly:153 regulate only the network elements 
that are essential bottlenecks and allow competition to flourish everywhere 
else. Otherwise, the whole concept of competition becomes meaningless; 
after all, on what basis is there to compete if everything is unbundled?154 
 
 
unbundling of that network element been crucial for the development of facilities-based competition in 
other countries? Can the element to be unbundled only be effectively duplicated at a very high 
expense, and if so, can only a small number of the users served by that be captured by existing and 
potential entrants?” See Pablo T. Spiller, Value-Creating Interconnect Unbundling and the Promotion 
of Local Telephone Competition: Is Unbundling Necessary in Norway?, Foundation for Research in 
Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Breiviken, Norway (Mar. 1998). 
 150. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388. 
 151. Id. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 152. Id. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring) (first emphasis added). 
 153. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 154. For a discussion on how this relates to the spate of CLEC bankruptcies, see infra Part II.C.4. 
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C. The Pricing Fiasco 
1. Overview 
The price at which to unbundle ILEC network elements has also been a 
subject of great interest and frustration.155 Pricing, however, is central to the 
effectiveness of any regulation. As Professor Eli Noam points out, the 
interconnection debate “is primarily a battle over prices and who can set 
them.”156 Given that the concept of moving away from retail rate regulation 
toward the regulation of bottleneck inputs is a relatively new idea,157 
economists still disagree on how to price access. At its core, the challenge is 
to set a price that is low enough to encourage new entrants, but high enough 
to encourage the incumbent to invest in the network.158 Striking this balance 
is the fundamental challenge. 
2. The Conventional Wisdom: TELRIC 
a. FCC Endorsement 
The FCC has determined that pricing should be determined using a 
concept known as “forward-looking economic costs.” More specifically, 
regulations define this as the “sum of: (1) [t]he total element long-run 
incremental cost of the element [(TELRIC)] . . . ; and (2) [a] reasonable 
allocation of forward-looking common costs . . . .”159 Common costs, in turn, 
are defined as costs “incurred in providing a group of elements or services 
. . . that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements or services.”160 
 155. See, e.g., Doane, supra note 21, at 312 (“How to set the prices paid by competitive local 
exchange carriers for the [unbundled network elements] of local exchange carriers has become perhaps 
the most contentious issue arising under the Act.”); Robinson, supra note 146, at 1222 
(“Commentators have debated the pricing issue endlessly.”). 
 156. Noam, supra note 100, at 972. See also Salvatore Massa et al., Pricing Network Elements 
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Back to the Future, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 751, 
786 (2001) (“The critical element that will determine competition in a regime that encourages access 
to an incumbent’s facilities is determining the appropriate price.”). 
 157. See supra Part II.A.1. For a history of rate regulation and court responses to it, see Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 3-15. 
 158. See, e.g., 2001 OECD Report, supra note 41, at 18 (“If interconnection charges are too high, 
it will discourage companies to enter the telecommunications market. On the contrary, if 
interconnection charges are too low and below real cost, the incumbent cannot recover its investment 
on networks and both the incumbent and new entrants will be discouraged to make future investments 
in infrastructure.”); Hold the Line: Connecting American Homes to the Internet Requires Strong 
Regulatory Nerves, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at 20. 
 159. FCC Common Carrier Services, 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a) (2001). 
 160. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(c)(1). 
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Most significantly, TELRIC “should be measured based on the use of the 
most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the 
lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the [ILEC]’s 
wire centers.”161 In other words, TELRIC is based on the incremental cost of 
a hypothetical network that is maximally efficient. 
b. Fundamental Problems 
There are at least two fatal problems with this methodology: its cost basis 
is too low, and it ignores existing cross-subsidies in telecommunications 
regulation. With regard to cost, pricing access at the incremental cost of the 
most efficient network will simply “not allow the operator to make a margin 
on its bottleneck segment.”162 A corollary to this reality is that an ILEC will 
have no incentive to invest in new network facilities if the resulting savings 
must be shared with competitors. 
For their part, new entrants will not want to invest because it is cheaper 
for them to simply rent ILEC infrastructure at below-market rates. Professor 
Jerry Hausman has even pointed out that the TELRIC methodology in effect 
grants a “free option” to new entrants, since it ignores the fact that there are 
significant sunk costs in telecommunications infrastructure.163 In other 
words, it will always be cheaper for CLECs to lease than to invest.164 As 
Sidak and Spulber have pointed out, TELRIC “is a mantra that 
misapprehends the most basic principles of price theory . . . . [T]he FCC 
paints an incorrect portrait of how competitive pricing works.”165 They have 
even argued that TELRIC violates the Takings Clause.166 
 161. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 162. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 6, at 173. See also Gary J. Guzzi, Note, Breaking Up the 
Local Telephone Monopolies: The Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 39 B.C. L. REV. 151, 193 (1997) (“The assumptions upon which TELRIC is based, practically 
speaking, can never be achieved. TELRIC assumes that the hypothetical [ILEC] always will be using 
the most efficient and most technologically advanced equipment at all times.”). 
 163. See Jerry A. Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications Regulation 3-4 
(Oct. 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/jhausman/files/ 
Colum98_rev3.pdf. 
 164. For the fallout from this reality, see infra Part II.C.4. Hausman’s prediction—written during 
the telecom boom years—that TELRIC “will likely have serious negative effects on innovation and 
new investment in the local telephone network” has proven quite prescient. See Hausman, supra note 
163, at 1. 
 165. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-
Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1139 (1997) (emphasis added).  
 166. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the 
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV 851 (1996). For a time, the takings issue spawned its own 
literature. See, e.g., David Gabel & David I. Rosenbaum, Who’s Taking Whom: Some Comments and 
Evidence on the Constitutionality of TELRIC, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 239, 253 (arguing that a taking has 
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To combat these allegations, some have offered modifications to cost-
based pricing, such as using actual (as opposed to hypothetical) incremental 
costs.167 Even if we assume, arguendo, that such approaches correct the cost 
basis, they do not address the second fundamental flaw with TELRIC 
pricing: namely, that any pricing methodology based uniquely on cost will be 
inaccurate in a world of hidden cross-subsidies where the actual cost of 
providing a service may have little to do with the amount that can be 
charged.168 For example, residential service is subsidized, creating “retail 
price discrimination”: telephone companies can charge businesses higher 
prices even though the cost of providing such service is the same or even 
lower than it would be to serve a residence.169  
In such an environment, TELRIC will create an arbitrage opportunity for 
new entrants: they will lease loops at hypothetical cost, but then only serve 
high-margin business customers.170 For their part, ILECs will be left with a 
disproportionate number of low-margin residential customers, further 
impeding their ability to recover costs. Indeed, this is exactly what has 
happened.171 Even some of the most eloquent TELRIC supporters pass 
quickly over this point. For example, Professors Hall and Lehr acknowledge 
the existence of “implicit subsidies” but simply posit that “prices should 
 
 
not occurred); E. Sanderson Hoe & Stephen Ruscus, Taking Aim at the Takings Argument: Using 
Forward-Looking Pricing Methodologies to Price Unbundled Network Elements, 5 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 231 (1997) (arguing that a taking has not occurred). The Supreme Court put any such 
discussion to an end in Verizon Communications v. FCC by stating that it did not think a takings 
question was even at issue since the ILECs had failed “to present any evidence that the decision to 
adopt TELRIC was arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose.” 535 U.S. 467 
(2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 57. 
 167. See Massa, supra note 156, at 777-80. 
 168. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, supra note 23, at 130 (pointing to the “continuing conviction that 
markets for telecommunications services ought to be governmentally managed so that they provide—
and to some extent conceal—pro-social cross-subsidies”). 
 169. See, e.g., Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 358-59; Doane, supra note 21, at 318. 
Universal service—a fund to provide telephone services to low-income consumers, high-cost service 
areas, rural healthcare providers, and schools and libraries—is another example of a cross-subsidy. 
See, e.g., Universal Service Fund, at http://www.fcc.gov/org/orgaudpm-usf.html. 
 170. According to the latest FCC statistics, business lines are twice as costly to end-users as 
residential lines. The average residential monthly rate in urban areas is $21.84 (with a $42.72 
connection charge). See FCC SOCC Report, supra note 5, Table 5.6. On the other hand, the average 
rate for a business with a single line is $42-45 (with a $72 connection charge). See id., Table 5.7. 
 171. See, e.g., supra note 61. See also Kathy Brister, FCC: Local Phone Competition Lags, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 29, 2002, at 1D (“Most competition has been for business customers, 
which are more lucrative than residential customers.”); Kosseff, supra note 67 (“Most of the 
competitors’ customers are businesses because telephone companies charge them more money per 
line—making them more attractive to competitors.”); Krause, supra note 26 (“Most telecom start-ups 
target small and midsize businesses, not residences.”); Rosenbush & Elstrom, supra note 67 (“[M]ost 
of the customers who have benefited are corporations, not residential customers.”). 
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reflect costs.”172 Clearly, this is not realistic in a political regime replete with 
cross-subsidies. 
c. Support Persists 
What is perplexing is that despite these inherent problems with the 
methodology, many well-known economists apparently support it. For 
example, in his book Telecommunications Competition, Professor Ingo 
Vogelsang writes: “The endorsement in the FCC’s order for those principles 
substantially widens the consensus that forward-looking, long run 
incremental costs of complete services and network elements are the 
appropriate basis for efficient pricing.”173 Professors Hall and Lehr similarly 
praise the FCC: “The FCC has developed a concept of cost, [TELRIC], that 
approximates the economist’s concept of cost suitable for setting the price at 
which a Bell should be required to sell network elements.”174 
Other commentators also seem to support TELRIC175 despite recognizing 
its inefficiencies.176 But arguably the reason that the methodology has 
garnered the FCC’s support is that Professor William Baumol has supported 
TELRIC. Not only is Professor Baumol an extremely well-respected 
economist with the ear of regulatory bodies,177 but Professor Baumol at one 
point developed an alternative to TELRIC, which, as Part II.C.5 discusses, 
 172. Hall & Lehr, Rescuing Competition, supra note 35, at 26. Interestingly enough, they also 
write that “[c]ompetition in long distance services has been vigorous because the Bells have been quite 
willing to sell access services to long-distance carriers at a regulated price that remains well above its 
cost.” Id. at 5. This is hard to square with their defense of TELRIC. After all, if policy dictates 
vigorous competition in local competition, unbundling prices should similarly allow the ILECs a 
profit. Perhaps because they are denied adequate profit, ILECs have resorted to litigation and paying 
fines. See infra Part II.D. 
 173. VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 245. 
 174. Hall & Lehr, Rescuing Competition, supra note 35, at 19. See also Hall & Lehr, Promoting 
Broadband Investment, supra note 98, at 10 (“If priced at long run incremental cost, the availability of 
unbundled network access provides efficient investment incentives to both entrants and the Bells.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Chen, Standing in the Shadows, supra note 98, at 931-38 (arguing that it is 
“stultifyingly simple” that ILECs should not be able to recover for “stranded costs”); Gabel & 
Rosenbaum, supra note 166, at 268 (“TELRIC pricing allows efficient entry because competitors can 
obtain access to the network at a price that reflects the cost to society of making the resources 
available.”); 2001 OECD Report, supra note 41, at 19 (noting the “general consensus” that has 
emerged around the “theoretical superiority” of long-run incremental cost methodologies). 
 176. For a particularly original defense of TELRIC, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural 
Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 1498 (1999) (“Nonetheless, TELRIC pricing of network components may make 
sense because it is a way of encouraging entry in the face of fear of predation, and also a way of 
reducing the danger that the incumbent will engage in a supply squeeze or targeted predation against 
an entrant . . . . This is of course a somewhat unorthodox defense of TELRIC, suggesting as it does 
that on occasion TELRIC will induce inefficient (meaning higher-cost) entry.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 93, at 1402. 
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avoids many of TELRIC’s pitfalls. Yet, as recently as 1998, Baumol 
concluded that: “[P]erhaps with some minor readjustment, the FCC’s 
proposed standard—and indeed, one that is based even more exclusively on 
efficient costs—is entirely consistent with the competitive market model and 
with the forward-looking cost criterion for public interest pricing.”178 
Professor Baumol appears to have subsequently changed views; indeed, 
determining his actual opinion on the issue has become a bit of a cause 
célèbre in economic circles.179 To summarize the TELRIC debate, and in the 
words of Sidak and Spulber: “[W]e argue that the FCC has fallen prey to 
several fallacies that make its version of pricing on the basis of forward-
looking costs a tautology. We do not understand Baumol and Merrill, or 
other scholars of their stature, to endorse those fallacies of economic 
reasoning.”180 
3. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
a. Majority Opinion 
Given the flaws in the TELRIC methodology, it should come as no 
surprise that the ILECs challenged it in court.181 Recognizing the importance 
of the issue, the Supreme Court agreed to hear it182 and delivered its opinion 
in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC.183 
In a detailed sixty-nine-page majority opinion, Justice Souter engaged in a 
careful discussion of various aspects of rate regulation and pricing, 
acknowledging that “competition in fact has been slow to materialize in 
local-exchange retail markets.”184 Despite this reality, the Court deferred to 
the FCC under Chevron and upheld TELRIC: “We cannot say whether the 
 178. William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require That We Kill the 
Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1122, 1147 (1998). 
See also William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory 
Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1997) (“Most 
economists, joined by the FCC and the majority of state [public utility commissions], believe that 
rational decisions on the pricing of unbundled network elements and access to local networks must be 
based on forward-looking costs.”). 
 179. In fact, the debate has apparently divided Baumol and Sidak, who had previously worked 
together on regulatory policy. See Jim Chen, TELRIC in Turmoil, Telecommunications in Transition: 
A Note on the Iowa Utilities Board Litigation, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 53 n.10 (1998). 
 180. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 165, at 1073. 
 181. See also infra Part II.D. 
 182. See Part II.B.1 and supra note 124. 
 183. 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term). Note that this case is a continuation of the 
Iowa Utilities Board saga discussed supra Part II.B.1 and infra Part IV.C.I. 
 184. 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 50. 
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passage of time will show competition prompted by TELRIC to be an 
illusion, but TELRIC appears to be a reasonable policy for now, and that is 
all that counts.”185 
It is critical to note that even though the Court may not have necessarily 
agreed with the FCC’s interpretation, it deferred to it by virtue of being a 
generalist judiciary: 
Whether the FCC picked the best way to set these rates is the stuff of 
debate for economists and regulators versed in the technology of 
telecommunications and microeconomic pricing theory. The job of 
judges is to ask whether the Commission made choices reasonably 
within the pale of statutory possibility in deciding what and how items 
must be leased and the way to set rates for leasing them. The FCC’s 
pricing and additional combination rules survive that scrutiny.186 
b. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that there was no “rational connection” 
between the FCC’s regulations and the Act’s deregulatory purpose.187 He 
perceptively criticized TELRIC along the lines of the economic arguments 
outlined above;188 namely, that it reduces incentives for new entrants to 
invest,189 and that an incumbent will not want to share cost-reducing 
investments with competitors.190 In particular, Justice Breyer highlighted that 
“prices like the Commission’s, based on the costs that a hypothetical ‘most 
efficient’ firm would incur if hypothetically building largely from scratch . . . 
[would create] incentives that hinder rather than further the statute’s basic 
objective.”191 
 185. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). Cf. WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 308 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The 
FCC need not choose the ‘optimal’ benchmark, only a reasonable one.”); SBC Communications, Inc. 
v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Congress quite clearly gave the Commission the primary 
responsibility to make delicate judgments under this statute and we may not presume that the 
Commission will perform that task in bad faith.”); W. Union Int’l, Inc. v. FCC, 804 F.2d 1280, 1292 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The FCC’s judgment about the best regulatory tools to employ in a particular 
situation is . . . entitled to considerable deference from the generalist judiciary.”). 
 186. 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 69 (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. at 4 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 188. See supra notes 162-72. 
 189. 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 12-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 14-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 12 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 407 (“In short 
the FCC’s action and inaction . . . suggested that the agency consciously sought to stimulate 
competitive entry into local telephony by encouraging (or commanding, if the courts would permit) the 
state [public utility commissions] to set prices and resale discounts that would not fully compensate the 
ILECs for their forward-looking common costs of local interconnection.”). 
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Finally, Justice Breyer highlighted his belief in a more active role for the 
judiciary: “[R]eview by generalist judges is important, both because technical 
agency decisions are often of great importance to the general public and 
because the law forbids agencies, in the name of technical expertise, to wrest 
themselves free of public control.”192 While Justice Breyer’s point about 
judicial oversight is well taken, few judges will have the necessary expertise 
to be able to question the gamut of administrative agencies.193 In pricing, as 
in the unbundling discussion above,194 we have a generalist judiciary able to 
identify the key issues but unable to do the FCC’s job for it. Implicit in 
Chevron deference is the notion of institutional competence. 
4. Economic Effects 
The FCC has thus promulgated a flawed pricing methodology. The 
Supreme Court intuitively realized the importance of the issue, but a majority 
deferred to the agency. Needless to say, this context is not conducive to 
competitive vigor and innovation. 
For their part, the RBOCs are faced with what Professor John Soma has 
dubbed a “Hobbesean” choice:195 they can either not invest, or they can 
invest and have competitors “free ride” on their investments.196 Indeed, the 
unbundling controversy is now prominent in analysts’ caution toward 
RBOCs as investment opportunities.197 
The enormous irony, however, is that TELRIC pricing has hurt the 
companies it was specifically designed to encourage the most—CLECs. 
Professor Jerry Hausman provided an early formulation of this thesis, as 
follows: CLECs had an incentive to expand as fast as possible, but none were 
forced to create any type of competitive advantage because they were 
essentially playing with the “free options” TELRIC gives them.198 CLECs 
thus spent a disproportionate amount of money on marketing without having 
a distinctive product to back it up. Professor Hausman concludes: “The result 
 192. 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 25 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 193. Justice Breyer is a notable exception, having taught administrative law for nearly thirty years. 
 194. See supra Part II.B. 
 195. Soma, supra note 147, at 609. 
 196. Thomas Jorde and others have even proposed a mechanism based on intellectual property 
jurisprudence to avoid the free riding. See Jorde, supra note 123, at 10-11. 
 197. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, The Telecommunicator: Telecom Act Seven Years On—The UNE 
Shock Wave Belatedly Reverberates Around the RBOCs—And How! (Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter 
Merrill Lynch Report]; UBS Warburg Global Equity Research, SBC Communications (Aug. 20, 
2002). Overall, however, the ILECs are still better positioned than other telecommunications carriers, 
with approximately $110 billion in revenues, and 30% operating margins. See FCC SOCC Report, 
supra note 5, Table 2.8. See also id., Tables 2.9 & 4. 
 
 198. See Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs, supra note 163. 
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was increasingly large amounts of money spent on customer acquisition 
without a concomitant return now, or one expected in the future. The equity 
values of the broadband CLECs plummeted and capital market[s] closed. 
The result was bankruptcy.”199 
This is congruent with Crandall and Sidak’s insight that “[a]n overly 
generous unbundling regime that rewards CLECs for deferring investment 
might be at the root of the CLECs’ problems.”200 Even FCC Chairman 
Powell’s recent comments seem to corroborate the fact that CLECs had few 
(if any) competitive advantages; he lamented the fact that several 
telecommunications companies “amassed staggering amounts of debt in 
building nearly-identical networks.”201 Unfortunately, regulatory policy has 
contributed significantly to this sorry state of affairs.202 
A further twist to this tragedy is that large long distance carriers such as 
AT&T and Sprint have been the incidental beneficiaries of the CLECs’ 
demise; for instance, they have bought physical assets at “garage-sale 
prices.”203 
 199. Jerry A. Hausman, Competition and Regulation for Internet-Related Services: Current 
Competition and 3G in the Future? 31 (Oct. 4, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/jhausman/files/DSL3G_v5.pdf. 
 200. Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 335. Some critics place much of the blame on former 
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt. See, e.g., Eisenbach, supra note 13 (“[Former FCC Chairman Hundt] 
believed that the way to inject competition into the local loop was to create a new breed of small, start-
up telephone companies, and he consciously exploited the notoriously ambiguous Telecom Act to 
write regulations in their favor . . . . Mr. Hundt sent a crucial signal to the entire market—that 
government was prepared to do whatever it took to ensure their success. And so it did: From below-
cost access to the incumbent carriers’ lines to an array of regulatory arbitrage opportunities, the FCC 
set out to create competition by creating, and supporting, competitors.”); Reinhardt Krause, “Market 
Exuberance” One Factor in Failure of Telecom Start-Ups; Study Says FCC Played a Role; of 300 
Local Phone Firms Existing, Three Years Ago, 70 Remained by Mid-02, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, 
Sept. 27, 2002, at A5 (noting that Hundt may have “put rules in place that led CLECs to expand too 
rapidly via leased lines . . . [and] didn’t do enough to encourage start-ups to build their own 
networks”). 
 201. Powell Senate Statement, supra note 9, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 202. In many respects this issue was repeated in the wireless arena, where the FCC tempted small 
bidders with favorable auction terms. These players also overreached and ended up bankrupt. See 
Pulley, supra note 8. 
 203. Steve Ulfelder, The DLECs’ Demise Upstart DSL Providers Claim Dirty Tricks by 
Incumbents Contributed to Their Downfall; End Result Is That Customers Might Be Paying More and 
Waiting Longer for Broadband, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 7, 2002, at 34. See also Merrill Lynch Report, 
supra note 186, at 3 (“Now that the capital markets have effectively dried up for competitive telecom 
companies and many start-ups have filed for bankruptcy protection, there are only a handful of 
companies that are and will continue to use UNE-P [(unbundled network element-platform, a 
combination of UNEs)] in a material way in order to compete in the local loop . . . AT&T and 
WorldCom.”); Legg Mason, SBC Communications: AT&T Pleads Its UNE Case (Sept. 18, 2002). 
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5. Proposed Approach 
a. Overview 
The bad news is that economically inefficient pricing is fairly common in 
telecommunications. The good news is that leading economists have 
developed microeconomic techniques to analyze the inefficiencies and offer 
new solutions in a variety of contexts.204 Indeed, there are a number of 
pricing mechanisms that would avoid many of TELRIC’s problems, 
including lowering termination charges rather than local loop charges205 or 
utilizing binding arbitration conducted by an independent arbitration body 
unconnected to regulators.206 
The most likely candidate to address the pricing woes, however, is the 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR).207 
b. Methodology 
At its core, ECPR is based on the concept of parity pricing or competitive 
neutrality, first articulated by Robert Willig208 and later applied to 
telecommunications by William Baumol.209 Its central idea is that an 
 204. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. W6260 (Nov. 1997), available at http://papers.nber.org/ 
papers/w6260.pdf (using public finance analysis to show that subsidizing Internet access for schools 
and libraries based on interstate telephone charges results in massive efficiency losses to the economy, 
in large part due to the “price elasticity of long distance service”); Jerry Hausman, Efficiency Effects 
on the U.S. Economy from Wireless Taxation, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. W7281, 14 (Aug. 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7281.pdf (providing a similar 
argument around the inefficiencies of current wireless taxation, adding that the “FCC and state 
regulatory authorities typically do not take into account efficiency effects on the economy from their 
regulatory actions”); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law and Economics of 
Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327 (1998) (arguing that 
the [public switched telephone network] will be used inefficiently as long as the FCC exempts ISPs 
from paying interstate access charges). 
 205. See, e.g., LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 6, at 208 (“It is more efficient to encourage 
competition through a low termination charge than through a low local loop rental charge. The former, 
unlike that latter, preserves a level playing field by not expropriating the incumbent.”). 
 206. See Hausman, Competition and Regulation, supra note 199, at 29 n.54. Currently, if the 
incumbent and the new entrant cannot achieve resolution, then the pricing issue is referred to state 
regulators. See also infra note 359. 
 207. Obviously, settling the microeconomic debate is not within the scope of this part. The 
discussion that follows is meant to illustrate that the pricing issue can be addressed in a much more 
efficient manner than it has been to date. 
 208. See Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY 
REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebbing ed., 1979). 
 209. See William J. Baumol, Having Your Cake: How to Preserve Universal-Service Cross 
Subsidies While Facilitating Competitive Entry, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1999). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Dibadj.doc 5/8/03   10:42 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
36 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:1 
 
 
 
 
 
incumbent firm should not be penalized for being efficient and should be 
able to recoup the opportunity cost of not being able to sell or use the 
bottleneck input, itself. In other words, an incumbent should be able to price 
the bottleneck input by subtracting the cost of its nonbottleneck inputs from 
the total price it is charging today. 
The principle essentially states that the bottleneck service210 should be 
priced at the bottleneck owners’ final price minus the incremental cost of 
supplying remaining inputs. What remains is the incumbent’s opportunity 
cost, or foregone retail revenue. Mathematically, the formula is simply: 
Pb = Pf – ICr 
where Pb is bottleneck price, Pf is final price, and ICr is the incremental cost 
of the remaining inputs. 
The power of ECPR is that it avoids the two fundamental problems of 
TELRIC: namely, an unrealistically low cost basis and the existence of cross-
subsidies.211 The first advantage is quite simple: ECPR is not based on 
hypothetical long-run incremental costs, but rather allows the incumbent to 
recover opportunity costs. 
The second advantage concerning cross-subsidies is more subtle. ECPR 
should not funnel the vast majority of new investment to business customers 
just because the price charged to business customers is higher than the price 
charged to residential customers. Assuming the incremental cost of the 
remaining inputs is similar, the price to charge a new entrant for a bottleneck 
input to a residential customer will be lower than that to a business 
customer.212 As a consequence, there should be no reason to discriminate 
against residential customers and “cream skim” business customers213 by 
charging prices well above what it costs to serve them.214 
 210. Here, the bottleneck is the “last mile” of wires going into a consumer’s home. Professor 
Baumol uses the example of a single railroad track along a mountain pass as an example of a 
transportation bottleneck. See id. at 10. 
 211. See supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 212. Or mathematically, if Pf is the price charged to a business customer and Pf’ is that charged to 
a residential customer, then Pf > Pf’. If we assume that ICr ~ ICr’, then Pb > Pb’. 
 213. For a classic exposition on skimming as a pricing strategy, see Alan Reynolds, A Kind Word 
for ‘Cream Skimming’, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 116. “Skimming” is often analyzed in 
contrast to “penetration,” which involves pricing low to increase market share in competitive markets. 
Id.  
 214. Over the long run, if bottleneck input regulation is implemented correctly, then retail price 
regulation will no longer be necessary, since competition should flourish on the nonbottleneck portions 
of the network. Competition would offer not only price discipline, but also innovative products and 
services. See also supra notes 70-74. 
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Notwithstanding the controversy among economists, it is relatively safe to 
posit that those experts who specialize in microeconomic analysis of 
telecommunications advocate ECPR.215 
c. Potential Issues 
The ostensible reason why the FCC has not adopted ECPR is because the 
existing retail prices that would be used to compute incremental opportunity 
costs under ECPR are not cost-based.216 The FCC presumably wants to be 
faithful to § 252(d)(1) of the Act, which requires that unbundling charges be 
“cost-based.”217 However, this position is untenable for a number of reasons. 
First, by definition, ECPR does take incremental costs into consideration.218 
Second, § 252(d)(1) evinces Congress’ intent to move away from rate-of-
return regulation, but otherwise leaves the definition of “cost” to the expert 
agency. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Verizon Communications, Inc. 
v. FCC: “[T]he word ‘cost’ in § 252(d)(1), as in accounting generally, is ‘a 
chameleon,’ a virtually meaningless term . . . . [W]ords like ‘cost’ ‘give 
ratesetting commissions broad methodological leeway; they say little about 
the ‘method employed’ to determine a particular rate.’”219 
The more likely reason why the FCC did not adopt ECPR is that its 
principal developer, William Baumol, seemed to advocate against it.220 
Apparently, Professor Baumol seems to have recently changed his mind.221 
Indeed, some even speculate that Baumol’s support of TELRIC was based on 
a “critical cost assumption [that was] empirically unsupported”222—namely, 
that Baumol had underestimated the actual magnitude of the nonincremental 
costs that TELRIC ignores.223 
Beyond this controversy, there are other potential problems with ECPR. 
For example, it does not take into account an incumbent’s fixed costs. The 
response to this is two-fold. First, one would presume that the incumbent 
 215. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government 
Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1081, 1111-12 (1997). For a more extensive discussion of ECPR’s advantages, see WILLIAM J. 
BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 116 (1994). For a 
discussion of the Baumol controversy, see supra note 179 and infra note 221. 
 216. First Report and Order, supra note 109. 
 217. See supra note 106. 
 218. See supra Part II.C.5.b. 
 219. 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 28-29 (citations omitted). 
 220. See supra notes 177-78. 
 221. See Baumol, Having Your Cake, supra note 209. See also Doane, supra note 21, at 314 (“The 
purpose of this Response is not to focus on Professor Baumol’s (welcome) change in position . . . .”). 
 222. Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 215, at 1138. 
 223. Notably, shared costs and common costs among network elements. See id. 
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would take into consideration its fixed costs and embed this into its price.224 
Second, as some commentators have suggested, an “end-user charge” can be 
added to ECPR225 in a manner loosely analogous to the “common costs” 
added to TELRIC.226 
Another issue is that an incumbent should not be able to maintain 
artificially high interconnection prices simply by maintaining an inefficient 
network. However, a modification to ECPR, M-ECPR, does address this 
issue: M-ECPR states that the price charged will be based on that of the most 
efficient competitor in the market.227 In other words, if there is a more 
efficient competitor, then the incumbent will not be able to recover its full 
price.228 Under M-ECPR, the incentive thus exists for the incumbent to invest 
in making its network at least as efficient as that of its competitor. 
d. Implications 
ECPR or M-ECPR might not be a “perfect” rule,229 but it is substantially 
better than TELRIC. Unfortunately, many commentators lament the fact that 
regulatory agencies have not even invested the time to understand ECPR’s 
fundamentals. For instance, some lament “the FCC’s unsophisticated 
caricature of ECPR.”230 Others even go so far as to point out that the FCC 
has a “complete misunderstanding of ECPR.”231 Whether this is true or not is 
beside the point. What is critical is that the FCC’s economists begin to 
engage in a dialog regarding how its current pricing strategy may be 
 224. The incumbent would need to have reasonable granularity in its data on costs and capital 
expenditures. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 61. 
 225. See Doane, supra note 21, at 322-23; Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons, 
supra note 215, at 1085. 
 226. See supra note 159. 
 227. Mathematically, if the most efficient competitor’s cost for the bottleneck input is Pb’’ and 
Pb’’ < Pb, then under M-ECPR, Pb assumes the value of Pb’’. 
 228. See Doane, supra note 21, at 322; Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra 
note 215, at 1093-96. 
 229. Some economists point to M-ECPR’s shortcomings, but they do not propose a workable 
alternative. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR (Dec. 1998), 
available at raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks/tragic.pdf (arguing that pricing should be based on social 
opportunity costs, rather than M-ECPR’s private opportunity costs, and concluding that ILECs will 
thus be able to charge inefficiently high prices). For a more nuanced discussion, including the fact that 
M-ECPR ironically may not be in the best interests of incumbents who are inefficient downstream 
from the input, see Dennis L. Weisman, The Efficient Component Pricing Rule: Friend or Foe? (May 
2002), available at http://www.ksu.edu/economics/weisman/ecpr.pdf. Professor Weisman’s 
microeconomic analysis provides further support for the notion that M-ECPR will have the salutary 
effect of encouraging an incumbent to invest in its network to become efficient. 
 230. Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons, supra note 215, at 1138 (emphasis 
added). 
 231. Doane, supra note 21, at 315 (emphasis added). 
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fundamentally flawed. 
Professors Laffont and Tirole have correctly observed that economists’ 
“deregulatory fervor is often guided more by a gut feeling that competition is 
efficient than by a clear conceptual framework embodying the specificities of 
these industries.”232 If prices had been set using a coherent “conceptual 
framework,” then perhaps the ongoing CLEC meltdown could have been 
mitigated, if not avoided.233 
D. One Good Deed Deserves Another: ILEC Reaction 
Before leaving the discussion of overly broad unbundling and 
inefficiently low pricing, it is worthwhile to discuss how ILECs, and in 
particular, RBOCs, have reacted. They have obviously engaged in a plethora 
of litigation, mostly to strike down poor implementing regulations.234 
But the academic literature to date has not focused on another aspect of 
the RBOCs’ behavior: quietly frustrating implementation and paying fines, 
almost as a cost of doing business. The local and trade press has chronicled a 
number of ways that ILECs have frustrated implementation: delaying repairs 
for CLEC customers,235 not processing CLEC orders in an timely manner,236 
losing orders outright, or claiming there are no existing facilities with which 
to interconnect.237 One competitor has even labeled it “success by 
incompetence” for the ILECs.238 
Large fines have become routine.239 The Association of Local 
 232. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 6, at 2. 
 233. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 234. Professor Rob Frieden points out that “Congress underestimated the ability of stakeholders to 
maintain or create a competitive advantage by thwarting progress through litigation and through the 
exploitation of ambiguous statutory language.” Rob Frieden, Wither Convergence: Legal, Regulatory, 
and Trade Opportunism in Telecommunications, 18 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 171, 178-79 
(2002). While agreeing with Professor Frieden’s overall point that players will try to “game” the 
system to their own advantage, it is important to note that the problem here is not the statutory 
language per se, but the regulations. In other words, the real question is whether Congress 
overestimated the capabilities of the FCC. See also infra notes 385-86. 
 235. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2 (reporting that Ameritech takes 36 hours to fix repair 
problems for its own customers, but 100 to 120 hours to do repairs for [the CLEC’s] customers). 
 236. See, e.g., Sanford Nax, Baby Bells Aiming Long: PUC Weighs SBC Bid to Offer Long-
Distance Services, THE FRESNO BEE, Jan. 13, 2002, at C1 (discussing accusations that Pacific Bell 
would delay order processing). 
 237. See, e.g., Ulfelder, supra note 203 (discussing the “truckloads of [lost] orders” as well as one 
ISP director’s reference to the Bells’ “no facilities lie”: “That’s a 60-story high-rise in midtown 
Manhattan . . . You’re telling us there’s not another twisted pair available?”). 
 238. See id. ILECs are also placing pressure on consumers; for example, by cutting off DSL 
service if they switch their local phone service to a new entrant. See Shawn Young, New Phone Twist: 
Switch Local Service and Lose Your DSL, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2003, at B1. 
 239. Fines are based on measures to determine whether ILECs are offering competitors the same 
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Telecommunications Services has estimated ILEC fines that add up to $1.8 
billion between 1996 and 2001 and an additional $3 billion in 2002.240 But, 
as the Boston Globe points out, this may simply be a small cost of doing 
business: 
Virtually every month brings news of the latest six- and seven-figure 
penalties paid by [the RBOCs]. Their offense: withholding or delaying 
access to their phone lines and switching stations [for a total penalty 
of] $1.4 billion—including $923 million from SBC alone—for poor 
service to rival phone companies and retail customers. It’s a number 
that sounds big, but represents less than 1 percent of the Bell 
companies’ combined 2001 revenues of $156.9 billion. And what is 
impossible to estimate is how many dollars of business the Bells kept 
competitors from getting.241 
Recently, a group of CLECs claimed that ILECs’ anticompetitive actions 
violated a number of federal and state laws, including the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, state antimonopoly statutes, 
unfair competition laws, and state law breach of contract.242 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned the district 
court’s dismissal of the CLECs’ action for failure to state a claim243 and has 
allowed the case to proceed.244 
The fact that so much of the lawsuit rests on antitrust and other common 
law could be interpreted as evincing a lack of faith in the FCC’s ability to 
remedy the situation.245 Perhaps it is no coincidence that one of the stated 
reasons FCC Chairman Powell is advocating facilities-based competition246 
 
 
level of service as their own retail operations. These include the number of days to connect lines, 
number of appointments missed, and other such factors.  
 240. See ALTS Annual Report, supra note 10, at 23. As just one example, the FCC has fined SBC 
$6 million for violation of unbundling requirements in association with the Ameritech merger. See 
News Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Fines SBC Communications, Inc. $6 
Million for Violations of Commission Merger Condition (Oct. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily+Releases/Daily_Business/2002/db1010/DOC-227223A1.pdf. 
 241. Peter J. Howe, Rivals Question Impact of Financial Penalties on Baby Bells, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 20, 2002, at C1. For an opinion piece on the subject by CLEC supporters, see Russell 
Frisby, Jr. & John D. Windhausen, Jr., Telecommunications Bell Companies Thwart Local 
Competition, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 2002, at P5A. 
 242. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 243. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 244. 299 F.3d at 1276. 
 245. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically agreed to determine whether private antitrust 
actional can supplement claims against ILEGs under the Act. See Low Offices of Curtis V. Traho v. 
Bell Atlantic, 294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1976 (U.S. Mar. 10, 2003) 
(No. 02-682). 
 246. See supra note 95. 
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is to lessen “dependency on an intransigent incumbent, who if committed to 
frustrate entry has a thousand ways to do so in small, imperceptible ways.”247 
But rather than throw in the towel, the FCC should try to reform its 
unbundling and pricing regulations using the techniques discussed in Parts 
II.B.3 and II.C.5, above. 
For now, we have the following perverse situation: a group of incumbents 
are engaging in something akin to guerrilla warfare248 to avoid a series of 
unbundling and pricing regulations that seemingly ignore basic economic 
principles. Given this sorry state of affairs, the lack of meaningful local 
competition should not be overly surprising. 
III. ALLOWING RBOCS TO COMPETE IN THE LONG DISTANCE MARKET 
A. Overview 
Entry into long distance presents a number of advantages for RBOCs. 
First, there is the opportunity to profit from a new business where 
infrastructure costs are lower than in local telephony.249 Perhaps more 
importantly, it allows RBOCs to bundle services, which reduces both 
administrative overhead and customer churn.250 The Act permits the RBOCs 
to enter the long distance market under certain conditions. 
The overarching theory is to allow RBOCs into long distance only if local 
competition provisions are met. Section 271, which provides the statutory 
framework for RBOC entry into long distance, is in many ways a quid pro 
quo for § 251. While the latter provides a “stick” to prod the RBOCs to open 
the market to local competition, the former provides a “carrot” in the form of 
the long distance market in exchange for providing access to local 
bottlenecks. In the words of Professor Thomas Hazlett: 
 247. Powell Communicopia Remarks, supra note 9. 
 248. As Professors Hall and Lehr point out: “Not surprisingly, the Bells have resisted the 
interconnection mandates of the Act since its passage. The Bells have sought to delay implementation 
of the Act at every juncture.” Hall & Lehr, Promoting Broadband Investment, supra note 98, at 7. 
 249. As prices for long distance have decreased, margins have declined as well. Nonetheless, the 
cost of providing long distance service is anywhere from one to three cents per minute, depending on 
the network. See, e.g., Karen Kaplan & Christine Frey, Long Distance May Face a Very Short Future; 
Telecom: Big Firms See Their Profits Fade as More Customers Go Wireless, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2002, at A1. Given that costs are so low, any pricing above this level provides incremental profit. 
 250. See, e.g., Reinhardt Krause, Bells on Brink of Going Long Distance; Many Approvals 
Expected Big Telecom Competition Is Set to Truly Arrive Soon in a Host of U.S. States, INVESTOR’S 
BUS. DAILY, Aug. 2, 2002, at A4 (“The Bells can still make money, though. That’s because their new 
long-distance customers are already their local phone customers. So billing and other expenses are 
reduced.”). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Dibadj.doc 5/8/03   10:42 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
42 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:1 
 
 
 
 
 
The Telecommunications Act was the product of realpolitik. Reforms 
of the size and scope of the Act involve compromises and pork barrel 
bargains, such that an actual majority—or super-majority to 
circumnavigate the veto power of various interest groups and 
necessary committee chairs—can form a coalition to enact law.251 
Reed Hundt, FCC Chairman at the time of the Act’s passage, even 
mentions that one senator told him: “We gave one side everything they 
wanted, and then we gave the other side everything they wanted . . . . Good 
luck.”252 The statutory language, while overly formalistic as a result of all 
this give-and-take, does allow the FCC leeway to permit an RBOC to enter 
long distance only if there exists meaningful competition in local telephony. 
Unfortunately, the FCC again does not seem up to the task. 
B. Statutory Framework 
The Act allows an RBOC to provide long distance253 services from within 
its region254 only if a series of four formal conditions are met.255 
The first condition is meeting the requirements of what have been termed 
“Track A” or “Track B.” Under “Track A,” an RBOC must show that it has 
“entered into one of more binding agreements”256 with new entrants for 
access to the incumbent’s local telephone network. If a new entrant has not 
requested such access, or the access has not been approved,257 then an RBOC 
can satisfy “Track B” by providing “a statement of the terms and conditions 
 251. Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political Consequences of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1389 (1999). See also Bhagwat, supra note 176, at 1479-80 (“[T]he Act 
sought to create incentives for LECs to cooperate in the development of local competition by offering 
the carrot that once the Bell Operating Company LECs complied with certain competition-permitting 
requirements, they would be permitted to enter into the long distance telephone market from which 
they had been long excluded.”); Joseph Farrell, Speech, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 201, 211 (1996) (Speech of FCC Chief Economist Before the FCC (calling 271 the “long-distance 
entry carrot”); Sloan, supra note 7, at 312 (“Congress held out interLATA entry as a reward for the 
BOCs’ acceptance of and compliance with interconnection, unbundling, and resale obligations 
designed to facilitate entry by alternative providers of local telecommunications services.”). 
 252. Rosenbush & Elstrom, supra note 67. 
 253. The Act uses the term “interLATA.” See 47 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002); supra note 6. 
 254. 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(2) provides that an RBOC “may provide interLATA services originating 
outside its in-region States [after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996], 
subject to subsection (j).” 47 U.S.C. § 291(b)(2). Section 271(j) in turn treats certain 800 and private 
line services as “in-region.” 47 U.S.C. § 271(j). The statute also allows RBOCs to provide “incidental 
interLATA services” such as audio and video programming. 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3). 
 255. For an in-depth discussion of § 271 requirements, see Sloan, supra note 7, at 321-86. 
 256. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A). 
 257. The approval process is carried out by state utility commissions under § 252. This aspect of 
the Act will be discussed in detail infra Part IV. 
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that the company generally offers to provide such access and 
interconnection” 258 that has been approved.259 
Second, an RBOC must meet a fourteen-point checklist, which is 
primarily designed to ensure that the RBOC has complied with §§ 251 and 
252, discussed in Part II.A.2.260 
The third condition the Act specifies261 is that the RBOC can only provide 
long distance services under the separate affiliate provisions of § 272.262 
Fourth, the FCC must determine that “the requested authorization is 
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”263 
What is particularly surprising, if not hypocritical, is that the RBOCs 
decided to litigate even the portion of the Act designed to help them.264 They 
challenged § 271265 as an unconstitutional bill of attainder266 and won in a 
federal district court.267 The district court’s opinion, however, was overturned 
on appeal.268 Although the statute had passed constitutional muster, the FCC 
would need to implement it.  
 258. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B). 
 259. See supra note 257. 
 260. More specifically, the RBOC must show that it will provide: 
interconnection conditions that meet § 251(c)(2) and § 252(d)(1); unbundling conditions that meet 
§ 251(c)(3) and § 252(d)(1); nondiscriminatory access to poles and other conduits under the Pole 
Attachments Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2003); local loop transmission; local transport; local 
switching; nondiscriminatory access to 911, directory, and operator services; white pages 
directory listing for new entrants; nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers; 
nondiscriminatory access to databases and other call routing signaling; arrangements for number 
portability; access to information required for dialing parity; reciprocal compensation 
arrangements; and resale that meets § 251(c)(4) and § 252(d)(3). 
See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B). 
 261. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B). 
 262. See 47 U.S.C. § 272 (2002). The RBOCs are now even pushing to be free from § 272 
separate affiliate requirements at a national level. See Bells Seek Companywide Sunsets on Sec. 272 
Requirements, LONG-DISTANCE COMPETITION REP., Aug. 19, 2002. 
 263. 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C). 
 264. See, e.g., Chen, The Magnificent Seven, supra note 7, at 1577 (“The [RBOCs] lobbied 
vociferously for the legislation that eventually became the 1996 Act. They then had the perfidy to 
challenge section 271 and the other BOC provisions of the Act as bills of attainder.”). Note that the 
RBOCs have even tried to enter into creative arrangements to circumvent § 271; for example, US West 
and Ameritech signed a deal to market Qwest’s long distance. The D.C. Circuit struck this down, 
finding that the RBOCs are effectively “providing” long distance services. See US West 
Communications v. FCC, 177 F.3d 1057, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (inquiring “whether a BOC’s 
involvement in the long distance market enables it to obtain competitive advantages, thereby reducing 
its incentive to cooperate in opening its local market to competition” (quoting In re AT&T Corp. et al., 
13 FCCR 21,438, 21,465 91 37 (1998)). RBOCs have also paid fines for marketing long-distance 
products even before obtaining § 271 approval. See, e.g., News Release, Federal Communications 
Commission, Verizan Admits Violations of Long Distance Marketing Ban—Company to Make $55.7 
Million Payment to U.S. Treasury (Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://hrawnfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC_231701A1.pdf. On the broader question of RBOC fines, see supra note 240. 
 
 265. In fact, the RBOCs challenged §§ 271-275, all under Part III of the Act labeled “Special 
Provisions Concerning Bell Operating Companies.” Sections 273-275 restrict manufacturing, 
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C. Subsequent Implementation 
For the first few years after the passage of the Act, no RBOC satisfied the 
requirements of § 271. Only five applications were approved269 during 
William Kennard’s tenure as Chairman of the FCC from 1997 to January 
2001. This dearth of approvals led numerous commentators to lament the 
“intense regulatory scrutiny”270 and advocate a less active role for the FCC. 
Professor Thomas Krattenmaker even complained that “[an RBOC] is not 
AT&T . . . . If the [RBOCs] are to be let in, they should be let in like 
everyone else.”271 
Soon after Michael Powell was designated as FCC Chairman on January 
22, 2001,272 however, the situation changed somewhat dramatically.273 From 
 
 
electronic publishing, and alarm monitoring activities. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 273-275 (2002). 
 266. “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 267. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997). For an overview of 
bill of attainder jurisprudence and a conclusion that the district court erred, see Thomas A. Buckley, 
Note, SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC: Does Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Constitute a Bill of Attainder Against the Bell Operating Companies?, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 225 
(1998). 
 268. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998). See also BellSouth Corp. 
v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that singling out of RBOCs does not raise equal 
protection concerns because they are not a protected class and there is a rational basis for the 
government’s actions; also finding that the 1996 Act does not re-open the provisions of the Modified 
Final Judgment (MFJ) against AT&T and thereby does not violate the separation of powers doctrine). 
For an argument that the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder protects political, not 
economic, rights, see Recent Cases, Constitutional law—Bill of Attainder—Fifth Circuit Holds That 
the Special Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Are Not a Bill of Attainder, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 1385 (1999). But see Karey P. Pond, Note, Constitutional Law—:The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996: When Legislative Regulation Becomes Unconstitutional Punishment, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. 
 
REV. 271 (2000) (arguing that §§ 271-276 of the 1996 Act constitute an unconstitutional bill of 
attainder). 
 269. The approved applications were Verizon in New York (Dec. 22, 1999) and Massachusetts 
(Apr. 16, 2001); and SBC in Texas (June 30, 2000) and Kansas/Oklahoma (Jan. 22, 2001). See Federal 
Communications Commission, RBOC Applications to Provide In-region, InterLATA Services under 
271 (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-
region_applications [hereinafter FCC § 271 List]. 
 270. Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 359. See also Swedenburg, supra note 25, at 1422. 
 271. Krattenmaker, supra note 23, at 160-61. Professor Krattenmaker goes on: “In sum, it is 
difficult to imagine a regulatory strategy, other than a permanent complete ban on entry into allied 
markets, for coping with the possibility of predatory cross-subsidization and discriminatory 
interconnection by Bell operating companies that is not employed, at one point or another, in the 1996 
Act.” Id. at 142. 
 272. See Federal Communications Commission, Biography of FCC Chairman Powell, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/mkp_biography.html. 
 273. The business press seems to have predicted this pattern. See, e.g., Krause, Telecom Act?, 
supra note 26 (“With a Republican-led FCC now reviewing long-distance applications, observers 
expect the Bells to seek approval in many more states.”). 
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January 2001 to January 2003,274 there were thirty approvals275 and no 
denials. RBOCs are thus free to enter long distance in most states, including 
heavily populated ones such as California and Florida. There are also several 
states where applications are under review by the FCC.276 
However, this rapid increase in the pace of approvals seems to have little 
to do with a rapid increase in competition. For instance, in December 2000, 
at which time there had only been four approvals, the nationwide CLEC 
share of end-user lines was 8%; by June 2002, it had increased a meager 3% 
to 11%.277 Moreover, there seem to be rather large disparities in the state of 
local competition even among the states that have already garnered approval. 
As Table 1 shows, RBOCs are now irreversibly allowed to provide long 
distance in states such as South Carolina and Mississippi where CLECs only 
have 5% or less market share. 
 
Table 1: CLEC End-User Switched Access Line Market Share in States 
Where § 271 Approvals Already Granted278 
State CLEC Market Share (%) 
Alabama 5 
Arkansas N/a279 
California 9 
Colorado 14 
Connecticut 9 
Delaware N/a 
Florida 9 
Georgia 13 
 
 
 274. Verizon’s approval to provide long distance in Massachusetts is not included here because 
this case was completed prior to Mr. Powell’s tenure as Chairman. See supra note 269. 
 275. Verizon in Connecticut (July 20, 2001), Pennsylvania (Sept. 19, 2001), Rhode Island (Feb. 
24, 2002), Vermont (Apr. 17, 2002), Maine (June 19, 2002), New Jersey (June 24, 2002), New 
Hampshire/Delaware (Sept. 25, 2002), Virginia (Oct. 30, 2002); SBC in Arkansas/Missouri (Nov. 16, 
2001), California (Dec. 19, 2002); BellSouth in Georgia/Louisiana (May 15, 2002), 
Alabama/Kentucky/Mississippi/North Carolina/South Carolina (Sept. 18, 2002), Florida/Tennessee 
(Dec. 19, 2002); Qwest in Colorado/Idaho/Iowa/Montana/Nebraska/North Dakota/Utah/ 
Washington/Wyoming (Dec. 23, 2002). See FCC § 271 List, supra note 269. 
 276. As of this writing, Verizon in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and West Virginia; SBC in 
Nevada and Michigan; Qwest in New Mexico, Oregon, and South Dakota. See id. 
 277. See FCC Local Competition Report, supra note 36, Table 7. 
 278. Based on the latest FCC statistics as of June 2002. See id. Table 6. 
 279. The FCC has withheld data “to maintain firm confidentiality.” See id. Table 7. Note that it is 
quite possible that CLEC market shares in these states are low, based on the fact that if there were 
multiple firms competing, the ability to identify the share of one firm based on aggregate data would 
be quite difficult. 
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State CLEC Market Share (%) 
Idaho N/a 
Iowa 12 
Kansas 9 
Kentucky N/a 
Louisiana 5 
Maine N/a 
Massachusetts 16 
Mississippi 2 
Missouri 8 
Montana N/a 
Nebraska 16 
New Hampshire 13 
New Jersey 6 
New York 25 
North Carolina 6 
North Dakota N/a 
Oklahoma 10 
Pennsylvania 15 
Rhode Island 18 
South Carolina 5 
Tennessee 7 
Texas 16 
Utah 13 
Vermont N/a 
Virginia 12 
Washington 9 
Wyoming N/a 
 
Moreover, because the approval process apparently does not distinguish 
between residential and business customers, it is highly likely that even in 
states where there is more robust CLEC competition, the bulk of that 
competition is for business customers; the vast majority of residential 
customers are captive to the RBOC for local telephone service.280 
The fundamental problem here seems to be that while the § 271 
requirements sound impressive and weighty, they simply do not take into 
 
 
 280. The FCC does not release state-by-state statistics on this point. However, based on national 
statistics, CLEC market share for residential and small business customers is less than 8%, whereas it 
is over 20% for medium and large businesses, institutional, and government customers. See id. Table 2 
(percentages calculated by dividing “Reporting CLECs” lines by (“Reporting ILECs” + “Reporting 
CLECs” lines) for each category). 
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account what the actual state of competition is, nor do they distinguish 
between residential and business customers.281 Moreover, the FCC seems to 
have been unable or unwilling to look beyond mechanics and approve or 
deny applications based on its “public interest” authority.282 
It should come as little surprise that the federal courts have intuitively 
realized the problems in the FCC’s implementation but have by and large 
been unable to step in and do the FCC’s job. For example, in AT&T Corp. v. 
FCC,283 long distance carriers challenged the FCC’s approval of Bell 
Atlantic’s284 application to provide long distance in New York, arguing that 
Bell Atlantic had not satisfied certain elements of the fourteen-point 
competitive checklist.285 While recognizing the potential issues raised, the 
D.C. Circuit ended up affirming the FCC’s decision with Chevron-like 
deference by stating that the “FCC’s decision seems reasonable.”286 
Long distance companies raised a more novel legal argument in Sprint 
Communications Co. v. FCC,287 where they argued that the FCC should take 
into account the low rate of local competition under its “public interest” 
standard. More specifically, the long distance companies argued that new 
entrants are subject to a “price squeeze” in the residential market because 
unbundling rates are set at such a high level that it is not possible to make a 
profit.288 Here, the D.C. Circuit remanded to the FCC to show that it had 
weighed the anticompetitive effects of its pricing methodology.289 
Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s careful analysis, the upshot of all this 
is that the FCC will likely allow RBOCs to compete in long distance in 
virtually all states,290 and the courts will defer to this implementation of 
§ 271. Indeed, the ultimate irony here is that the combination of RBOC 
mergers291 and long distance approvals means that the telephone market 
 281. See also supra Part III.B. 
 282. See supra note 263. 
 283. 220 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 284. Following a series of mergers, Bell Atlantic became Nynex, and Nynex became Verizon. See 
also supra note 57. 
 285. 220 F.3d at 615. 
 286. Id. at 617. Note the similarity to the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications v. 
FCC, 533 U.S. 467 (2002) (No. 00-511, 2001 Term), at infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
 287. 274 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 288. See id. at 553. Note that this is merely an artifact of the flawed TELRIC methodology, which 
could be avoided using techniques such as ECPR. See supra Part II.C.5. 
 289. 274 F.3d at 562. The D.C. Circuit did exactly the same thing in WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 308 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding to the Commission, noting that “classic price squeeze cases have 
never turned on a finding that competition by the input-purchasing firms was absolutely precluded”). 
 290. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 57. 
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could largely be back to the situation it was in pre-AT&T divestiture292—
now with four “baby” AT&Ts.293 Contrary to Professor Krattenmaker’s 
comment,294 then, RBOCs are actually becoming more and more like an 
AT&T. 
Both the national press and leading academics have recently begun 
pointing to this disturbing state of affairs. The New York Times has written 
that “the supposed tidal wave of competition that the law was expected to 
unleash is barely a ripple for most local phone consumers”295 and that under 
§ 271 “[n]o actual competition . . . was required—and relatively little has 
materialized.”296 The Wall Street Journal has drawn insightful parallels to the 
airline and banking industries postderegulation to argue that poor 
telecommunications deregulation may have the same dangerous effect of 
creating a handful of large players who have little incentive to innovate.297 
Professor Lawrence Sullivan has pointed out: “There are real risks that 
RBOCs will gain [interexchange or long distance] access while their local 
monopolies remain substantially intact . . . . The risk is the one that the now 
displaced AT&T antitrust consent decree dealt with.”298 Professors Joskow 
and Noll sum up the situation eloquently by stating that “repeal of the Bell 
doctrine could be the ultimate effect of the Act if [an RBOC] satisfies the 
checklist but local service competition never emerges.”299 Professor Jim 
Chen even warns that there is a current threat to “reshape the mass media 
markets in the image of the original communications monopoly, the Bell 
system.”300 
 292. Except perhaps for a few large business customers in denser areas. 
 293. Perhaps even fewer if the current RBOCs merge further. 
 294. See supra note 271. 
 295. Schiesel, For Most Local Phone Users, supra note 74. 
 296. Schiesel, Sitting Pretty, supra note 83. 
 297. Shawn Young et al., Familiar Ring: How Effort to Open Local Phone Markets Helped Baby 
Bells, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A1. See also Schlesinger, supra note 77. 
 298. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Elusive Goals under the Telecommunications Act: Preserving Long 
Distance Competition upon Baby Bell Entry and Attaining Local Exchange Competition: We’ll Not 
Preserve the One unless We Attain the Other, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 487, 490 (1996). Note of course that 
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), which broke AT&T up into the seven RBOCs, prohibited the 
RBOCs from providing long distance services. 
 299. Joskow & Noll, supra note 19, at 1281 (emphasis added). 
 300. Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications 
Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1508 (1996). It is particularly interesting to observe that at one 
point Professor Chen advocated RBOC entry into long distance; he has subsequently changed his 
mind. See Chen, supra note 7, at 1579-80. 
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D. Proposed Approach 
We are thus left with a situation where a seemingly strict set of 
requirements, under the weight of simplistic implementation, has the 
potential of eviscerating the Bell doctrine. However, this situation could be 
avoided simply by paying attention to whether there is actual competition, 
and if so, where the competition is focused. 
In other words, before granting an RBOC approval to enter the long 
distance market, there would have to be local competition in the state beyond 
a certain threshold, perhaps 25% to 30%. In addition, this competition could 
not be focused exclusively among large business customers; there would 
have to be a certain minimal threshold among residential customers, perhaps 
15% to 20%.301 
Such a proposal is not as radically different as it may appear at first. After 
all, commentators have already lamented the fact that § 271 approvals are 
premised on a mere statement of terms, rather than actual competition302 and 
have pointed out the need for “the Commission’s review of [RBOC] 
interLATA applications to be forward-looking in nature—where the 
agency’s attention is focused less on what has happened before an 
application’s filing and more on what will happen in the event a request is 
granted.”303 Even a former FCC Commissioner has argued that “the best test 
whether a Bell company has met the act’s [sic] requirement to open the local 
market is this: do consumers have a real choice of local service 
providers?”304  
There are a number of ways the approval process could move away from 
§ 271’s current formalism and toward an inquiry focused on the existence of 
actual competition. The most straightforward, and also least practical, would 
be for Congress to speak on the issue. However, given the political give-and-
take,305 it is already quite remarkable that Congress was able to come up with 
 301. The natural question that might come up regards what happens if such competition does not 
develop; that is, what will occur if competitors do not step up to the plate? First of all, if taken in 
conjunction with the unbundling and pricing reforms suggested in Part II infra, this is unlikely to 
happen. If we assume, arguendo, however, that such an unfortunate situation does in fact evolve, then 
under this methodology, the RBOC would be prohibited from entering long distance. This should be 
unsurprising. After all, the RBOC is still maintaining its local monopoly; it would be difficult for it to 
argue that it should not only hold onto its local monopoly, but also be allowed to enter long distance. 
 302. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 176, at 1499-50.  
 303. Sloan, supra note 7, at 397. 
 304. Ness, supra note 17 (emphasis added). Commissioner Ness further points out that 
“[e]specially now, six years after the [A]ct was passed, one would expect that if the local market were 
truly open we would see high levels of actual competition in the residential market by service 
providers using a variety of forms of market entry.” Id. 
 305. See supra Part III.A. 
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the statute as it stands, as imperfect as it might be. 
The more tenable solution is for the FCC to step up to the plate and 
actually put teeth behind its “public interest” mandate306 and not allow the 
meeting of formal requirements to masquerade as competition. This is 
exactly what the FCC did recently, for example, in denying the 
EchoStar/DirecTV merger.307 The “public interest” standard in § 271 
currently appears to be inconsequential because applications are currently 
being approved if they meet the formal conditions set forth in the statute.308 
To give it meaning, the FCC must move beyond its mechanical checklist.309 
In disaggregating the local network, the FCC promulgated regulations 
that were designed to help new competitors, but the regulations were so 
inefficient that they ended up hurting both incumbents and new entrants.310 In 
allowing RBOC entry into long distance, the FCC has unleashed a process 
whereby RBOCs are able to provide long distance services without even 
having to show that their local markets are actually competitive. Doubly poor 
implementation has heaped insult upon injury to the cause of local 
competition. 
IV. FEDERALISM 
A. Underlying Tension 
We come at last to the thorny issue of federalism. The previous parts of 
this Article present suggestions for improving the lot of local competition: 
apply antitrust principles to the unbundling reforms, reform the pricing 
algorithm to comport with economic reality, and grant long distance 
approvals only if viable competition actually exists. 
The federalism issue is subtler and, of course, pervades our entire 
jurisprudence.311 On the one hand, the American legal system has historically 
been built on state autonomy—the law respects, if not cherishes, the notion 
of state independence—each state as a laboratory of experimentation. On the 
other hand, the exigencies of modern life and globalization often require a 
 306. See supra note 263. 
 307. See FCC EchoStar/DirecTV press release, supra note 89 (denying merger because it did not 
serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity”). 
 308. See supra Part III.B. 
 309. See also Michael F. Finn, The Public Interest and Bell Entry into Long-Distance under 
Section 271 of the Communications Act, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 203 (1997) (arguing for greater 
use of the public interest standard). 
 310. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 311. For an excellent discussion of the inherent tensions in federalism, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995). 
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central authority such as the federal government to impose uniformity and 
reign in maverick states. Many landmark Supreme Court cases have had a 
federalism dimension to them—from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins312 to 
Bush v. Gore.313 The intersection of telecommunications and federalism is 
also a fertile area.  
Federalism in the telecommunications context naturally has costs and 
benefits. Costs include the inefficiencies and possible contradictions of 
having parallel systems, as well as the threat of large corporations improperly 
influencing local regulators.314 Benefits include the ability to benchmark 
among different agencies and the fact that splitting authority among different 
levels of government provides a counterbalancing force against regulatory 
capture by incumbents.315 
The relative merit of these costs and benefits can be debated endlessly.316 
The reality is that the United States was founded on notions on federalism 
that continue powerfully to this day; it would be altogether naive and 
impractical to abandon these concepts and exclude the states in 
telecommunications policy, even assuming this would not offend traditional 
notions of sovereign immunity.317  
Specifically in the context of local telephone competition, we must not 
forget that the “United States is the only country where the regulatory 
supervision on interconnection is shared by a federal agency (FCC) and State 
public utility commissions (PUCs).”318 In the words of FCC Chairman 
Powell: “[W]e cannot succeed alone. We share authority with the states.”319 
Indeed, every case under the Act that has made it to the Supreme Court 
has brought with it a federalism dimension, the most prominent to date being 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board320 and Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public 
 312. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 313. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 314. See, e.g., supra note 97; James K. Glassman, Editorial, Local Phone Service Fiasco Sure 
Rings a Bell, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2000, at D17 (“These behemoths [the RBOCs] 
control the last mile of telecommunications into the home. Their monopoly status is protected and 
regulated by often captive and generous state officials.”). 
 315. See, e.g., LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 6, at 274-75. For an argument advocating 
federalism in environmental regulation using the tools of public choice analysis, see Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
553 (2001). 
 316. As Professors Laffont and Tirole point out, with some understatement: “As for the broader 
issue of the optimal number of regulators, though, things are more complicated.” LAFFONT & TIROLE, 
supra note 6, at 275. 
 317. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 318. 2001 OECD Report, supra note 41, at 12. 
 319. Powell Communicopia Remarks, supra note 9. 
 320. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Dibadj.doc 5/8/03   10:42 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
52 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:1 
 
 
 
 
 
Service Commission of Maryland,321 discussed below.322 
It would be belaboring the obvious to note that such litigation has 
necessarily created delay and uncertainty in local competition. Such debate, 
however, is inevitable within the broader legal tension. If channeled 
correctly, it may even be healthy. Congress has fashioned an innovative 
framework to mediate the roles among the FCC, the state commissions, and 
the federal courts. To be sure, there are improvements that are proposed to 
the framework, but it offers a valuable starting point. 
B. Statutory Guidance 
There are three critical areas within the Act where federalism issues are 
prominent. First, and most famously, § 252 lays out a process by which the 
state commission facilitates ILEC agreements with new entrants, as required 
by the local competition provisions of § 251.323 To begin with, a new entrant 
can negotiate with the ILEC;324 if an agreement is reached, it is submitted to 
the state commission for approval.325 If—as has happened in practice—the 
parties are unable to reach an agreement, then the state commission is 
required to arbitrate and resolve the dispute326 within the pricing boundaries 
of § 252(d)(1).327  
Importantly, Congress has provided two federal safeguards against state 
power. On the one hand, if a state commission does not carry out its 
responsibilities, the FCC is empowered to “issue an order preempting the 
State commission’s jurisdiction of that proceeding or matter [and] assume the 
responsibility of the State commission under this section with respect to the 
proceeding or matter and act for the State commission.”328 On the other hand, 
the statute expressly provides that a party aggrieved by a state commission’s 
determination “may bring action in an appropriate Federal district court.”329 
Second, before making any determination under § 271, the FCC is 
instructed to “consult with the State commission of any State that is the 
 321. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 322. In addition, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC involved a challenge to the FCC’s 
authority to design and implement TELRIC. See supra note 183. Another Case, Gulf Power, dealt with 
federal authority to set fees for use of utility poles under the Pole Attachments Act. See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832, 2001 Term). 
 323. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 324. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1) (2002). 
 325. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(1). 
 326. 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(b)(1), (b)(4). 
 327. See supra note 106. See also First Report and Order, supra note 109, at 812 (noting that 
states retain flexibility to consider local factors when applying the TELRIC methodology). 
 328. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5). 
 
 329. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6). 
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subject of the application in order to verify the compliance of the Bell 
operating company.”330 
Third, an often de-emphasized part of the Act is § 253, which is designed 
to remove barriers to competitive entry. The statute provides that “[n]o State 
or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide 
any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”331 In addition, if the 
FCC finds that a state or local government is violating this prohibition, it 
“shall preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal 
requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or 
inconsistency.”332 Finally, Congress has vested the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia with jurisdiction to hear cases by “any 
applicant for authority to provide interLATA services under section 271 of 
[the Act] whose application is denied by the Commission.”333 
The overarching message is thus relatively clear: state commissions do 
function as the first line of defense in ensuring CLEC competition and 
RBOC long distance entry. But the FCC has not only the power but the 
express obligation to oversee this regulatory scheme in a manner that fosters 
local competition. As Professor Howard Shelanski has pointed out, 
Congress’ preemption of state and local laws that inhibit competition should 
not be overlooked.334 
C. Supreme Court Interpretation 
1. Iowa Utilities Board 
Before addressing the “necessary” and “impair” standards,335 the 
Supreme Court in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board336 had to decide the 
threshold issue of whether the FCC even had authority to regulate local 
competition, given that states have traditionally been allowed to regulate 
intrastate matters. The Court granted certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit, relying on Section 2(b) of 
the Communications Act of 1934, which does not allow the FCC to regulate 
 330. 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(B) (2002). 
 331. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 332. 47 U.S.C. § 253(d). 
 333. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(9) (2002). Note that allowing this jurisdiction only in cases where an 
application is denied may have been an additional “carrot” offered to the ILECs. See supra Part III.A. 
 334. See Shelanski, supra note 100, at 1638. 
 335. See supra note 104. 
 336. 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
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intrastate communications,337 ruled that there is a fence that is “hog tight, 
horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states’ 
intrastate turf.”338 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied on Section 201(b), a 1938 
amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, that provides: “[t]he 
Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in 
the public interest to carry out the provisions of [the 1934 Act].”339 Justice 
Scalia combined this with § 251(i) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996—
stipulating that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
otherwise affect the Commission’s authority under section 201”340—to find 
that the FCC has authority to implement the local competition provisions.341 
The majority also responded to Justice Breyer’s concern that there is a 
presumption against preemption of state police powers because “local rates 
are local matters for local regulators.”342 Justice Scalia noted that “[i]f there is 
any ‘presumption’ applicable to this question, it should arise from the fact 
that a federal program administered by 50 independent state agencies is 
surpassing strange.”343 
Justice Scalia concluded by noting that the FCC has broad discretion 
under the Act: 
The 1996 Act can be read to grant (borrowing a phrase from 
incumbent GTE) “most promiscuous rights” to the FCC vis-à-vis the 
state commissions and to competing carriers vis-à-vis the 
incumbents—and the Commission has chosen in some instances to 
 337. “[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction 
with respect to . . . charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in 
connection with intrastate communication service.” 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 338. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1997). For an insightful critique of the 
Eighth Circuit’s view of jurisdictional matters, see Chen, TELRIC in Turmoil, supra note 179. For 
support of the view that the FCC should not interfere with intrastate communications, see Guzzi, supra 
note 162, at 188-90. For a nuanced argument that § 2(b) should be interpreted “to apply with greatest 
force to intrastate services that have a direct relationship with the consumer or end user, since this is 
the aspect of intrastate services that is closest to the sphere of influence of state regulators,” see Duane 
McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone under the 1996 Act: Fenced Off?, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2210, 2250 (1997). 
 339. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2002). 
 340. 47 U.S.C. § 251(i) (2002). 
 341. 525 U.S. at 377-78. 
 342. Id. at 420 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 343. Id. at 378 n.6. 
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read it that way. But Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it 
chooses to produce in a statute will be resolved by the implementing 
agency.344 
Moving beyond the specifics of the case at hand, the Court insightfully 
grasped that the Act, by its very design, had moved federalism into uncharted 
waters. Justice Scalia noted that we now live in 
a scheme in which Congress has broadly extended its law into the 
field of intrastate telecommunications, but in a few specified areas 
(ratemaking, interconnection agreements, etc.) has left the policy 
implications of that extension to be determined by state commissions, 
which—within the broad range of lawful policymaking left open to 
administrative agencies—are beyond federal control. Such a scheme is 
decidedly novel, and the attendant legal questions, such as whether 
federal courts must defer to state agency interpretations of federal 
law, are novel as well.345 
Some commentators have criticized the Court for its reliance on 
supposedly textual analysis,346 but others praise the court for allowing a 
national telecommunications policy.347 The reality, as with most federalism 
issues, is more subtle. On the one hand, the Court correctly interpreted 
Congress’ desire to allow the FCC broad authority to implement local 
competition; on the other, it acknowledged the role state commissions play, 
perhaps realizing, for example, that the FCC does not have the resources to 
do everything itself. 
 344. Id. at 397 (citation omitted). 
 345. Id. at 385 n.10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court later evoked the same theme in the 
context of pricing network elements. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) 
(No. 00-511, 2001 Term), slip op. at 16 (“The approach was deliberate, through a hybrid jurisdictional 
scheme with the FCC setting a basic, default methodology for use in setting rates when carriers fail to 
agree, but leaving it to state utility commissions to set the actual rates.”). 
 346. See, e.g., John E. Taylor, Note, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board: The Supreme Court 
Recognizes Broad FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Competition, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1645, 1704 
(2000) (“Although the Court claimed to articulate the plain meaning of the 1996 Act, its decision on 
the pricing jurisdiction issue is better supported by the ‘silent dogs’ argument than by textual 
analysis.”). 
 347. See, e.g., Charles H. Sanders, Note, A Step Toward Competition in Local Telephone Service: 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 650 (1999) (“By firmly establishing 
the FCC’s jurisdiction to implement the Act, the Court has effectively ensured that deregulation of 
local telephone service can evolve under a uniform national program, rather than dooming the process 
to individualized determinations in state regulatory commissions prone to capture by [ILECs].”). 
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2. Verizon Maryland 
In Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland,348 
Verizon filed suit against the Maryland Public Service Commission for 
ordering it to pay compensation to WorldCom for certain calls made by 
Verizon’s customers.349 The issue was fundamentally whether a federal court 
can entertain a suit against a state commission without violating the state 
sovereign immunity doctrine.350 
Again writing for the majority, Justice Scalia determined that Verizon 
could bring the claim under federal question jurisdiction,351 but did not 
decide whether § 252(e)(6) of the Act offers an alternative basis for 
jurisdiction.352 The Court also allowed the suit against the state 
commissioners to proceed under the doctrine of Ex parte Young,353 which 
permits a federal court to enjoin a state official from violating federal law.354 
Iowa Utilities Board gave the federal government flexibility to preempt 
state actions. In many ways, Verizon Maryland’s narrow interpretation of 
state sovereign immunity complements Iowa Utilities Board by allowing 
federal judicial oversight of state utility commission actions. A slew of recent 
cases from the courts of appeals seems to confirm this.355 
 348. 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (No. 00-1531, 2001 Term). 
 349. Id., slip op. at 3-4. 
 350. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to prevent states from being 
sued in federal court. Some jurists, notably Justice Souter, argue that by its own language the 
amendment is merely a bar to state-citizen diversity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) 
(Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). For an analysis of state sovereign immunity that predates Verizon Maryland, see Douglas 
C. Melcher, State Sovereign Immunity and Judicial Review of Interconnection Agreements under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 61 (2000) (providing an overview of the 
abrogation doctrine, waiver, and Ex parte Young); Jake C. Blavat, Note, Wisconsin Bell v. Public 
Service Commission of Wisconsin: Problems in the Telecommunications Act in the New Age of 
Sovereign Immunity, 2000 WIS. L. REV, 1149 (2000) (arguing that the 1996 Act violates the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
 351. 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (No. 00-1531, 2001 Term), slip op. at 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides: 
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2002). 
 352. In particular, the Court reasoned that “[e]ven if § 252(e)(6) . . . does not confer jurisdiction, it 
does not divest the district courts of their authority under § 1331.” 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (No. 00-1531, 
2001 Term), slip op. at 5. 
 353. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 354. Ex parte Young is fundamentally based on the legal fiction that a suit against a state official is 
not a suit against the state. 
 355. See, e.g., US West Communications, Inc. v. Jennings, No. 99-16247, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
19798, at *16 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2002) (“In sum, we follow the Act’s charge to the federal courts to 
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D. Proposed Approach 
1. Three-Tiered Methodology 
In order to balance states’ rights against the needs of a uniform, national 
telecommunications policy, a three-tiered approach should be fashioned 
consistent with Congress’ guidance, Iowa Utilities Board, and Verizon 
Maryland. The first level is comprised of the state commissions: under better 
FCC guidance,356 they are the “first line of defense” to implement the 
unbundling provisions of § 251357 and long distance provisions of § 271.358 
One important modification would be to have an independent board of 
arbitrators, rather than the state regulatory commission, arbitrate disputes.359 
This alone could prevent problems from escalating into battles pitching state 
regulators against federal regulators.360 
If, however, the issues are not resolved, then we move to the second tier 
where the FCC must directly step in under its statutory authority confirmed 
under Iowa Utilities Board.361 If a state commission is not fulfilling its § 251 
duties, the FCC must exercise its preemptive authority under § 252(e)(5).362 
Moreover, the FCC has more general preemption powers under § 253363 if 
any state or local body is acting in a manner that prevents local competition. 
The third and final tier consists of the federal courts. In the context of 
unbundling, § 252 gives specific authority for an aggrieved party to bring an 
action in federal district court.364 Note that under Verizon Maryland, suing 
state commissions would not offend sovereign immunity and would be 
permissible under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.365 In the context of § 271 
 
 
review the agreements for compliance with the Act, rather than for the correctness of the state 
commission’s decisions.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 298 F.3d 1269 
(11th Cir. 2002) (upholding district court’s reversal of Florida Public Service Commission’s arbitration 
decision based on inconsistency with federal law); Global NAPS, Inc. v. FCC, 291 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (holding that FCC has prerogative not to preempt a state commission’s decision under 
§ 252(e)(5)); RT Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir 2000) (finding that federal 
regulation preempts Wyoming statute designed to protect rural telecommunications carriers from 
competition for a period of ten years). 
 356. Which the FCC, unfortunately, is still having trouble giving. See supra note 139. 
 357. See supra notes 323-26. 
 358. See supra note 330. 
 359. See Hausman, Competition and Regulation, supra note 199. There is no reason that 
independent boards of arbitrators could not be established on a state-by-state level. 
 360. See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra note 328. 
 363. See supra note 332. 
 364. See supra note 329. 
 365. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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denials by the FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.366  
2. Should State Agencies Be Creating Federal Common Law? 
The major question, as Justice Scalia points out, is whether the federal 
courts should defer to state agency interpretations of federal law.367 
Supporting this point of view is Professor Philip Weiser, one of the leading 
commentators on federalism and telecommunications. Professor Weiser 
argues that the Act moved away from a traditional model of federalism and 
toward “cooperative federalism” where state agencies implement federal 
authority.368  
Even though this interpretation is tenable, Professor Weiser, and other 
like-minded commentators, have taken the argument too far to suggest that 
Congress could have chosen “to delegate federal authority to state agencies 
without FCC oversight.”369 In a series of articles on the subject, he further 
suggests that federal courts should offer the same deference to state 
commission decisions as they do to federal agency decisions.370 This belies 
two fundamental realities: Congress is not directly responsible for state 
agencies,371 and the Act itself gives recourse to federal courts to review state 
agency decisions.372  
In addition, Weiser suggests that somehow “the incentive for parties to 
 366. See supra note 333. 
 367. See supra note 345. 
 368. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 33 (1999) (“The underlying vision of cooperative federalism is that state agencies 
will compete with each other by implementing statutes like the Telecom Act in a manner that each 
believes will best facilitate economic development in its respective state. In so doing, they will 
continue to serve as ‘laboratories of democracy.’”) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 369. Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 
819, 823 (2000). See also Beynon, supra note 121, at 41-43 (arguing that FCC did not need to 
establish national pricing rules to implement local competition provisions). 
 370. See, e.g., Weiser, Chevron, supra note 368; Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra notes 125; 
Weiser, Paradigm Changes, supra note 369. 
 371. Professor Weiser does offer some countervailing arguments. See Weiser, Chevron, supra 
note 368, at 26-27. But his arguments that Congress can withhold money from state commissions or 
preempt state law are unconvincing because these arguments could be applied to virtually any state 
action. In addition, even though it is true that the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Sentencing 
Commission enjoy Chevron deference, such agencies are within the purview of the federal government 
and are hardly nonaccountable, as Professor Weiser suggests. The insularity of the Federal Reserve 
Board, for example, is purposely crafted within federal law to ensure independence. See also Joshua D. 
Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 205 (1997). 
 372. See supra note 329. 
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seek a better deal from the courts than they obtained from state regulators 
will be enormous.”373 It is difficult to fathom, however, what incentives a 
federal court—rather than a state commission—has to grant either party a 
“better deal.”374 Leaving aside these policy issues, the Act’s regulatory 
framework makes such suggestions unworkable. As the Supreme Court 
noted in Iowa Utilities Board: “This is, at bottom, a debate not about whether 
the States will be allowed to do their own thing, but about whether it will be 
the FCC or the federal courts that draw the lines to which they must hew.”375 
In sum, Congress has devised a new solution to address complex notions 
of federalism, and the Supreme Court has determined that this scheme passes 
constitutional muster. Given the novelty of the approach, mistakes will 
happen,376 and improvements will need to be made.377 The system will 
necessarily be more complex than if Congress were simply to preempt the 
entire area of local telecommunications or if the federal courts were merely 
to defer to state agencies. Unfortunately, neither approach is practical or 
desirable. More importantly, neither is permitted under the careful balance 
the Act strikes. 
 373. Weiser, Chevron, supra note 368, at 47. 
 374. In a later article, Professor Weiser has perhaps moderated his position, suggesting that 
“uniformity sometimes can be one important consideration” or speaking of a “federally acceptable 
range of reasonableness.” Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 125, at 1709-11. He further adds: 
“Regimes should impose national rules where doing so gives rise to substantial efficiencies, protects 
important equity concerns, guards against substantial interstate spillovers, or prevents a ‘race to the 
bottom’ between states.” Id. Nonetheless, Weiser still posits that “[e]mbracing the state agency’s 
creation of federal common-law rules may prove to be the ultimate test of whether state agencies and 
federal courts can conceptualize properly the cooperative federalism architecture of the Telecom Act.” 
Id. at 1761. 
 375. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 376. See, e.g., Weiser, Federal Common Law, supra note 125, at 1746-47 (“Perhaps because the 
architecture of cooperative federalism regulatory regimes remains a relatively unfamiliar topic, the 
relevant agencies and the courts all appear to keep looking to one another to clarify how they should 
work in practice. Reflecting an almost comic result of this dynamic, the FCC initially justified the 
authority of state agencies to enforce interconnection agreements (subject to federal judicial review) on 
the ground that judicial questions already had endorsed this reading of the Act—ignoring the fact that 
the judicial decisions in question had themselves relied on the FCC’s prior suggestions of such a 
reading.”). See also Kimberly L. Sharkey, Comment, Confusion in the Wake of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Standard of Review Should Courts Employ When Evaluating 
Interconnection Agreements?, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 831, 833-34 (2001) (arguing that federal courts 
should apply a de novo standard to state commission interpretations of federal law unless the FCC has 
promulgated rules on the subject). 
 377. For example, section 410(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 permits boards or 
conferences to foster greater dialogue between state and federal regulators. One commentator suggests 
broader use of federal-state joint boards, in particular with regard to advanced telecommunications 
capabilities. See Bob Rowe, Strategies to Promote Advanced Telecommunications Capabilities, 52 
FED. COMM. L.J. 381, 402 (2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
Local wireline infrastructure is not going away anytime soon and 
competition on these wires is unlikely to flourish without proper regulation. 
Current regulation has left a lot to be desired: essentially unlimited 
unbundling, pricing that defies economic logic, and an opportunity for 
RBOCs to enter the long distance market without showing actual competition 
in local markets. This combination, if unchanged, is a lethal impediment to 
competition. It is thus important to get it right. 
Courts have been able to sense intuitively the importance of issues 
brought to them, offered advice to regulatory bodies, and have even 
occasionally invalidated rules. But, by and large, courts will defer to agencies 
under Chevron. As the D.C. Circuit has pointed out, courts will defer to 
agencies where issues involve “a high level of technical expertise in an area 
of rapidly changing technological and competitive circumstances.”378 It is 
striking, for instance, that the Supreme Court’s lengthy opinion in Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC defers to the FCC on TELRIC because it is 
“reasonable”379 and nothing more.380  
Courts thus cannot be the bulwark that ensures local competition because 
they lack the institutional expertise—notwithstanding certain judges like 
Justice Stephen Breyer who hold unusual expertise in the administrative 
law.381 
 378. Sprint Communications Co. v. FCC, 274 F.3d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also AT&T 
Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[W]e cannot imagine a question more suited for 
administrative rather than judicial resolution than whether copper or fiber loops are more cost-
effective.”); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]hese terms [in § 251] 
are found in a circumscribed statutory provision that seeks to ensure competition in areas of advanced 
technology in telecommunications . . . . This is hardly the stuff of ‘plain meaning.’”).  
 379. See supra note 185. 
 380. This argument is pervasive in recent appellate opinions. See, e.g., Ass’n of Communications 
Enters. v. FCC, 253 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that the FCC is “reasonable” in saying that 
ILEC’s offering of DSL to ISP is not subject to resale requirements); WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 
F.3d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that FCC’s order saying ILECs providing DSL have § 251(c) 
duties is “reasonable”); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d at 421 (finding that the FCC collocation 
order withstands judicial scrutiny because it is not “arbitrary or capricious”); Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co. vs. FCC, 168 F.3d 1344, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the FCC’s use of industry-wide 
averages to set access rates for local exchange carriers’ collocation to enable competition in long 
distance was not “arbitrary or capricious”). Cf. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (accepting FCC’s revised rules on collocation of interconnection equipment); WorldCom, Inc. v. 
FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is not our role to second guess the FCC’s policy 
judgment, so long as it comports with established standards of administrative practice.”); Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co. vs. FCC, 180 F.3d. 307, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[O]rder denying reconsideration is not 
reviewable for material error but only for new evidence or changed circumstance”). 
 381. See supra note 193. 
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The burden to reform regulation rests, as it should, with the expert 
agency: the FCC. The importance of the FCC’s actions cannot be 
underestimated.382 In fairness to the agency, it has been presented with a 
gargantuan task of enormous complexity. To begin with, the entire concept 
of opening local markets to competition is new.383 In addition, Congress went 
about this task in a subtle manner: unbundle RBOC bottleneck inputs, allow 
RBOCs into long distance in exchange for local competition, and manage the 
whole process using new federalism notions that allow state commissions to 
implement the policy with the guidance of the FCC and oversight of the 
federal courts. Add to the mix an industry that is, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, “technical, complex and dynamic,”384 and the possibility of 
meltdown is high.385 
As Professor Krattenmaker has pointed out, “[o]ne reads the new Act in 
vain for something that reflects Congressional awareness that the FCC may 
not be omnipotent, its commissioners not omniscient.”386 But central to this 
Article’s thesis is that there is really no need for the FCC to be omniscient 
and design the “perfect” regulatory scheme.  
In fact, quite the opposite may be true. If the FCC were to get the “basics” 
right—what to unbundle and at what price—by looking to antitrust and 
microeconomic principles, that alone would go a long way to bringing about 
true local competition. Adding the simple notion that one would expect 
actual competition, not formalisms, to materialize before allowing RBOCs 
entrance into long distance, the improvements would be even bigger.  
 382. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 298, at 490 (“What this legislation means and what effects it 
will have will depend, as a practical matter, on the content of FCC regulations and on how that statute 
and regulations are administered at both the federal and state levels.”). 
 383. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 146, at 1217-18 (“Opening local markets to competition had 
not occurred to anyone in 1974 when the government filed the antitrust action, nor in 1982 when the 
courts dismembered the Bell system. The Justice Department and nearly everyone else regarded local 
telephone markets as a naturally monopolistic industry in which competition was not sustainable, and 
hence not economically efficient. Times change, and sometimes ideas change with them. In one of the 
most remarkable paradigm shifts in modern industrial history, Congress simply ignored the natural 
monopoly model.”). 
 384. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 00-832, 2001 
Term), slip op. at 10. See also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“We 
note at the outset the extraordinary complexity of the Commission’s task.”). 
 385. As Thomas Hazlett points out: “The telecom marketplace is a big, complicated place, and the 
[1996 Act] was a big, messy bill.” Hazlett, supra note 251, at 1362. Professor Hazlett later adds, 
somewhat tongue in cheek: “The FCC will foul up, which is why God created Congressional 
oversight.” Id. at 1367. 
 386. Krattenmaker, supra note 23, at 173. See also Robinson, supra note 146, at 1218 (“It must 
have seemed so simple to a Congress accustomed to issuing orders in the manner of Jean Luc Picard of 
the USS Enterprise: ‘make it so, number one.’ And the FCC, a dutiful if not always fully informed 
number one, tried to make it so.”). 
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What Crandall and Sidak term “the current gulf between first principles 
and established law”387 is in many ways astounding. There is no reason why 
the FCC should not be up to the task if it pays attention to the fundamentals 
discussed in this Article. Indeed, despite the latest unbundling fiasco,388 an 
optimist might find a few encouraging signs from the FCC. For example, 
perhaps implicitly referring to the local competition debacle, Commissioner 
Abernathy advocates “adhering closely to the precise language in the 
statute—and refraining from broadening (or constricting) rights based on our 
own policy preferences.”389 
Chairman Powell also has made very insightful and refreshing comments: 
plainly laying out the industry’s problems,390 admitting that poor policy may 
have had something to do with the current crisis,391 and underscoring the 
importance of regulation in a marketplace that tends toward monopoly.392 He 
has also acknowledged the importance of the states393 and has begun to use 
the “public interest” standard to deny license transfers.394 
Occasionally, though, one is surprised by certain pronouncements. For 
example, in the unbundling context, the Chairman seemed to deflect 
responsibility from the FCC by commenting that the agency is “still in the 
Supreme Court trying to define the fundamentals of the policy.”395 Rather, he 
should ask himself, first, if anything could have been done to avoid having 
the controversy end up in the Supreme Court and, second, whether the 
Supreme Court can and should be in the business of setting 
telecommunications policy. In an interview with the Washington Post, the 
Chairman also mentioned that he is not the “grand master chef of 
competition” nor a “bankruptcy court” nor “in a position to play Alan 
Greenspan.”396 The question then becomes: at a very fundamental level, what 
is his vision for the agency he leads? 
 387. Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10, at 409.  
 388. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 389. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 
199, 209 (2002). The newest FCC Commissioner, Jonathan Adelstein, also seems to espuse this point 
of view. See Health of the Telecommunications Sector: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 26, 2003) 
(statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission), available 
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC_231535A4.pdf (“First and foremost, my 
role is to implement the law as written by Congress, not to impose my own policy preferences.”). 
 390. See supra note 9. 
 391. See supra note 16. 
 392. See supra note 85. 
 393. See supra note 319. 
 394. See supra note 89. 
 395. Litigation Expected, supra note 85. 
 396. Goodman, supra note 82. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss1/1
p 1 Dibadj.doc 5/8/03   10:42 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 63 
 
 
 
 
 
The stakes for the FCC to get it right are enormous.397 Local telephony is 
an industry with more than $100 billion in yearly revenues.398 Its fate 
necessarily impacts the entire telecommunications industry with over $1 
trillion in revenues, or about 10% of gross domestic product.399 Moreover, 
recovery in telecommunications is critical to overall economic recovery. 
Methodologically, understanding how to manage “last mile” 
telecommunications bottlenecks will prepare the FCC for future challenges. 
Today, the bottleneck is a local copper wire loop; tomorrow, it could be a 
fiber optic line400 or another technology that is prohibitively expensive to 
replicate.401 Interestingly, during the Internet boom years, even very 
distinguished commentators got swept up in the frenzy. They argued that 
somehow the open architecture of the Internet would make such seemingly 
mundane issues obsolete.402 But these important questions endure.403 
The themes discussed in this Article also have repercussions for regulated 
industries beyond telecommunications such as energy and transportation. 
Around the world, the mandate of regulatory agencies is being transformed 
 397. See, e.g., Peter J. Howe, Get Off the Line Baby Bells Complain Telecom Rivals Get Below-
Cost Access to Their Networks . . . But Critics Say Monopoly-Minded Bells Want to Crush 
Competition, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 2002, at D1 (“Much of the debate gets conducted in an 
incomprehensible lingo . . . [b]ut the stakes for the economy, the stock market, and consumers are 
vast.”). 
 398. See supra note 34. 
 399. See Pulley, supra note 8, at 78. 
 400. See, e.g., Hall & Lehr, Promoting Broadband Investment, supra note 98, at 17 (“Telecom 
policy needs to deal with the distinct possibility that the broadband service of the future will arrive at 
the home over a fiber circuit with a substantial bandwidth advantage over any wireless alternative. In 
that case, all of the problems connected with the Bells’ control of the existing copper circuit will 
remain.”). 
 401. Indeed, one might argue that certain components of wireless or satellite systems present 
“bottleneck inputs” given the extremely high capital expenditures required to create those 
infrastructures. 
 402. See, e.g., Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategy, Structure and Regulation: 
Telecommunications in the New Economy, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 253, 275 (2000) 
(deemphasizing the importance of physical assets and arguing that “[s]uccessful telecommunications 
firms must thus follow their Internet counterparts to try to turn rents that have been eroded into long-
term rent-generating positions. One of the key lessons that should be learned is that expansion is 
crucial.”); John D. Podesta, Unplanned Obsolescence: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the 
Internet, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1996) (“I want to discuss why the Internet may provide a 
paradigm which leapfrogs the current debate.”). 
 403. Needless to say, even framing the debate in terms of “structural separation” of ILECs into 
retail and wholesale businesses cannot avoid the fundamental questions: who gets what elements and 
at what price? For an argument against structural separation, see Crandall & Sidak, supra note 10; for 
the point of view that structural separation is a good thing, see Hall & Lehr, Rescuing Competition, 
supra note 35. For a twist on the structural separation debate, see T. Randolph Beard et al., Why 
ADCo? Why Now? An Economic Exploration into the Future of Industry Structure for the “Last Mile” 
in Local Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (2002) (advocating entrance of a new 
exclusively wholesale carrier known as an “alternative distribution company”). 
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from setting retail rates to developing and implementing regulatory 
paradigms for accessing and pricing bottleneck inputs.404 The problems that 
plague these industries are not intractable; however, as in 
telecommunications, they will surely require more than the “stroke of a 
pen.”405
 
 
 404. See supra note 93. 
 405. See supra note 2. 
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